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Abstract
This dissertation examines three themes of efﬁciency in ﬁsheries economics and man-
agement. The ﬁrst theme is intertemporal efﬁciency; by examining ﬁshery management
problems within a stochastic bioeconomic model, the tradeoffs between current and future
consumption are clear. The second theme explored in this essay is the efﬁciency of trad-
able permits system in the presence of trade restrictions. The third theme explored in this
dissertation is efﬁciency in the presence of ecosystem externalities.
Fisheries managers must often make decisions even while there is large amounts of
uncertainty regarding stock level; furthermore, there are often fairly long periods of time
in which they are unable to assess stock levels. The ﬁrst essay examines a bioeconomic
ﬁshery model that includes rigidity in the policy-setting process, a management reality that
has yet to be incorporated into these types of models. Although analytically intractable, the
model is simulated across a range of biological and institutional parameters to learn how
this rigidity affects the manager’s optimization problem. While the effects of rigidity with
deterministic stock growth are shown to be small; when growth is stochastic, the present
value of ﬁsheries revenue may drastically decline under rigid management. By solving
for the present value of ﬁsheries revenues across a wide range of parameter values, the
economic tradeoffs between management and scientiﬁc activities can be clariﬁed.
The second essay examines bilateral bargaining in a market for a unique synthetic input
permits, Days-at-Sea, in the Northeast groundﬁsh ﬁshery. This research applies a quantile
regression approach to the estimation of bargaining power and tests a key identiﬁcation
assumption of bargaining power equality made by previous researchers. One of the ﬁndings
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of this research is that current regulations may have segmented this market, endowing some
ﬁrms with bargaining power relative to others.
The ﬁnal essay examines a small ecosystem-economy in which there are competing
extractive and non-extractive uses for the ﬁshery resource. In this ecosystem, herring are
commerically harvested and are food for whales, which are an input in a non-extractive
tourism industry, whale-watching. A ﬁnding of this research is that ﬁshing negatively im-
pacts the whale-watching industry; however, the magnitude of these effects are small. The
results contained in this essay are useful inputs for managers seeking to implement Ecosys-
tem Based Fishery Management.
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To Diana.
iv
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would not have been possible without the invaluable help of my disserta-
tion committee.
The majority of this research was conducted while I was a Sea Grant-NMFS Fellow
in Marine Resource Economics. Staff at the Northeast Fisheries Science Center have been
particularly helpful and supportive. A portion this research was also funded by a University
of Illinois Graduate College Dissertation Travel Grant. I would also like to thank the Blue
Ocean Society for Marine Conservation, Ocean Alliance, the Center for Oceanic Research
and Education for providing whale-watching data.
v
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Fishery Management in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Three Essays on Fisheries Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chapter 2 The Effects of Policy Rigidity on Optimal Fisheries Management . . 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Policy Rigidity and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 3 Bargaining for Homogeneous Goods:
The Days­at­Sea Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 The Days-at-Sea Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Empirical Model and Data Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter 4 Economic Tradeoffs in the Gulf of Maine Ecosystem: Herring and
Watching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1 The Whale-watching Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.2 The Herring Fishery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Modeling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Data and Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.6 Conclusions and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Chapter 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix A Logistic Growth and a 2 Year Planning Period . . . . . . . . . . . 97
vi
Appendix B Numerical Methods for Dynamic Programming . . . . . . . . . . 99
Appendix C Days­at­Sea Leasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists have typically addressed three major issues in the ﬁeld of ﬁshery manage-
ment: intertemporal efﬁciency, allocative efﬁciency of markets, and efﬁcient production
in the presence of externalities. This dissertation is composed of three essays that address
these topics. The ﬁrst essay examines the effects of stock-growth uncertainty and pol-
icy rigidity using a bioeconomic model. Policy rigidity is a management institution that
utilizes a constant control variable (harvest or quota) for a relatively long period of time.
During this time, the stock may experience multiple growth shocks. The second essay
examines bilateral bargaining in the market for Northeast Multispecies Groundﬁsh Days-
at-Sea (DAS). This unique system was initially designed as a simple input control, but has
since evolved into a tradable input control. The DAS market has few, if any characteristics
of a market: prices are not publicly available, speculation is explicitly disallowed, there
are legal limitations that govern potential trading partners, and ﬁnding a trading partner
may be costly. The ﬁnal essay examines a small economy containing extractive (ﬁshing)
and non-extractive uses (whale-watching) as an example of the Ecosystem Based Fisheries
Management (EBFM) approach.
1.1 Fishery Management in the United States
Management of ﬁsheries in the United States is a complex process with many involved par-
ties. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCA),
regional Management Councils propose ﬁshery management plans (MSFCA, 2007). The
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regional Councils are composed of stakeholders, typically ﬁshing industry groups, and are
advised by National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and academics on scientiﬁc and
technical issues. Proposed regulations are then adopted and enacted by the Department of
Commerce. The regional Councils are guided by many pieces of legislation, including the
MSFCA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).
The MSFCA and subsequent amendments establishes 10 “National Standards” or prin-
ciples for ﬁshery management.
1. Management plans should prevent overﬁshing and achieve Optimum Yield.
2. Managers should use the best available science.
3. Stocks of ﬁsh that are interrelated should be managed jointly and individual stocks
should be managed as a single unit.
4. Management measures should not discriminate across states. Permits or priviledges
should be assigned fairly and equitably; furthermore, no entities should acquire ex-
cessive share of those priviledges.
5. Management plans should consider efﬁciency, but not be solely based on economic
efﬁciency.
6. Management plans should take variability of stocks and catches into account and
include contingencies.
7. Management plans should minimize costs and duplication of compliance effort.
8. The economic and social impacts on ﬁshing communities should be taken into ac-
count.
9. Management plans should minize bycatch and mortality of bycatch.
10. Management plans should promote safety at sea.
Many of the terms included in these standards are subject to interpretation; however,
Optimum Yield has speciﬁcally been deﬁned by Congress. Optimum Yield is deﬁned as
the harvest that produces the greatest net beneﬁts to the United States and equal to the
maximum sustained yield less any reduction for economic, social, or ecological factors.
The last of these, “ecosystem considerations,” has served as motivation for the adoption of
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Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004). For stocks that
are overﬁshed, Optimum Yield is deﬁned as the yield that allows for rebuilding stocks to
levels that would produce the maximum sustained yield.
NMFS has produced guidance documents that interpret and operationalize the National
Standards described in the MSFCA (NMFS, 2008). For example, the interpretation of Na-
tional Standard 1 has produced many reference points for ﬁsh stocks. Maximum Sustained
Yield (MSY) is deﬁned as the largest long-run average yield of a stock, given ecological
conditions and ﬁshing technology in use. Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) are catch
levels which account for scientiﬁc uncertainty and must be less than Optimum Yield (OY).
An Annual Catch Limit (ACL) is a threshold catch level that must be less than ABC; if
catch rises above this level, Accountability Measures (AMs) are implemented. Together,
ACLs and AMs are intended to act as a deterrent to overﬁshing. Finally, Annual Catch
Targets (ACTs) are the target harvest rate of managers; these are less than ACLs and are
set to account for management uncertainty.
As a part of the Executive Branch, Department of Commerce regulations are also guided
by Executive Order 12866, which was signed by President Clinton in 1993. Under this
Executive Order, regulatory agencies should assess costs and beneﬁts of alternative reg-
ulations, including costs of enforcement and compliance that are borne by government
agencies. Regulatory actions should maximize net beneﬁts to the United States and use
incentive based systems in place of command-and-control systems when possible. Further-
more, regulatory agencies should use “the best reasonably obtainable scientiﬁc, technical,
economic, and other information.”
In 2008, the National Marine Fisheries Service reviewed the status of 531 ﬁsh stocks
in the United States to determine whether these stocks were overﬁshed or if overﬁshing
was occurring (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009). These determinations were made
on a stock-by-stock basis and relied solely on biological indicators, estimated Maximum
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Sustained Yield and current harvest levels1. An overﬁshed stock of ﬁsh is characterized
by stock levels that are “too low,” while overﬁshing indicates that current harvest levels
are “too high.” Scientiﬁc uncertainty was so large that determination of overﬁshed status
could be made on only 199 of those 531 stocks. Of those 199 stocks of ﬁsh, 46 (23%) were
classiﬁed as overﬁshed. Determination of overﬁshing status could be made on only 251
of the 531 stocks reviewed. Of those 251 stocks, 41 (16%) were experiencing overﬁshing.
Clearly, uncertainty is abundant in ﬁsheries management.
1.2 Three Essays on Fisheries Economics
The ﬁrst essay in this dissertation examines the impacts of policy rigidity and uncertainty
on optimal ﬁsheries policy and value. Intertemporal efﬁciency has been examined using
bioeconomic models since the work of Clark (1976). By modeling the ﬁshery as a capital
asset, the tradeoff between present and future consumption is clear: increasing current con-
sumption typically lowers the productivity of the resource and therefore future consump-
tion. The analytical solutions of deterministic models typically lead to a natural resource
“golden rule”: optimal harvest of the resource precisely balances the marginal beneﬁts
of harvest against marginal opportunity costs of harvest that are derived from lower pro-
ductivity. With this rule in hand, it is often possible to solve for the explicit harvest and
stock levels that maximize net beneﬁts. However, analytical solutions often become dif-
ﬁcult to understand with the introduction of stochastic stock growth and/or measurement
error (Clark and Kirkwood, 1986; Costello et al., 2001; Sethi et al., 2005). As noted by
Thompson (1999), the analytical solutions produced by bioeconomic models are complex
and infrequently implemented.
The classical bioeconomic models have assumed that the manager has information
about the present stock size and is able to adjust the harvest or quota levels “quickly”
1These indicators are B�SY - the stock that produces the Maximum Sustained Yield and F�SY - the
harvest rate associated with MSY, along with B and F , the actual stock and harvest rate.
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(Reed, 1979; Clark and Kirkwood, 1986). However, this may not be a realistic assump-
tion: the slow-moving political bodies may simply be unable to do so. These agencies
may have chosen longer management intervals directly, perhaps to reduce the transactions
costs of management. They may also have chosen them indirectly, through the allocations
of labor and funds to scientiﬁc and management activities for various species and stocks
of ﬁsh. Both time and money are required for accurate science and management; policy
rigidity may a consequence of these allocation decisions. Examination of the effects of
rigidity and uncertainty on the the present value of the ﬁshery can clarify the embedded
economic tradeoffs between gathering information and proceeding with management ac-
tivities (Hansen and Jones, 2008; Mantyniemi et al., 2009).
The second essay in this dissertation examines the effects of institutional limitations on
bargaining power in a synthetic market. This essay adapts Harding et al.’s (2003) hedonic
bargaining power model to examine how characteristics of buyers and sellers determine
prices for Days-at-Sea (DAS). This tradable effort control system is a synthetic permit
market with many limitations on trade and a lack of an actual marketplace. Once buyers
and sellers match, trades are likely to be negotiated through a bilateral bargaining process.
The industrial-organization literature in this ﬁeld typically assumes that trade generate eco-
nomic surplus; the two parties bargain over the division of that surplus (Blair et al., 1989).
Harding et al. (2003) make strong identiﬁcation assumptions; the unique nature of DAS
allows these assumptions to be critically examined.
When stock use is not rationed, either through price or quantity controls, the stock is
typically overused in the production process, causing stock collapse. There are many pos-
sible solutions to the public goods problem: properly calibrated access fees, effort controls,
landings taxes, and aggregate or individual quotas could all be used if the manager has
full information about production technology. Transferable rights based systems, typically
based on output, have become popular as a ﬁsheries management tool to achieve allocative
efﬁciency (Batstone and Sharp, 2003; Costello et al., 2008). However, input control sys-
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tems continue to be popular with the ﬁshing industry (Rossiter and Stead, 2003). National
Standard 4 requires management plans and activities to prevent the entities from obtaining
“excessive share” of ﬁshing priviledges. While this term is never deﬁned, a reasonable
interpretation of this may include the ability to exert market or bargaining power. Examin-
ination of bargaining power in this market can provide insight into best practices for other
synthetic markets.
The ﬁnal essay in this dissertation is examines production in the presence of external-
ities. There are few commercial marine ﬁsheries that are completely isolated. Many are
linked to other commercial ﬁsheries, either through biological (predator-prey) interactions
or through joint production technology in harvest. Others are linked to recreational ﬁsh-
eries, non-extractive uses, or non-harvested (but desirable) species. Under the deﬁnition
of Optimum Yield in the MSFCA these linkages must be accounted for in setting pol-
icy. Many economic methods have been used to examine and address the interconnections
in the ecosystem, from bioeconomic predator-prey and ecosystem models (Ragozin and
Brown, 1985; Brown et al., 2005; Finnoff and Tschirhart, 2003) to econometric charac-
terization of the joint production technology (Squires, 1987; Squires and Kirkley, 1991).
These economic methods can inform managers as they implement Ecosystem Based Fish-
ery Management (EBFM), in which entire ecosystems, not just a single target species, are
managed (Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004).
Dynamic, long-run bioeconomic models are not always necessary for the implemen-
tation of the EBFM approach to management. This approach also requires knowledge
of short-term ecosystem linkages, especially as they affect human activities. Using the
ecosystem-externality model of Crocker and Tschirhart (1992), this research provides in-
sight into the external effects of ﬁshing activity on a non-extractive tourism industry.
The essays in this dissertation examine three general aspects of efﬁciency in ﬁsheries
economics and policy. Bioeconomic models can be used to examine intertemporal efﬁ-
ciency issues. Tradable permits are thought to be lead to efﬁcient production; the second
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essay examines an existing market and provide insight into the effects of market institu-
tions. The Ecosystem Based Management paradigm recognizes that the ﬁshery is just one
use of marine resources; the ﬁnal essay examines the the short-term effects of ﬁshing on a
non-extractive (tourism) industry.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Policy Rigidity on
Optimal Fisheries Management
2.1 Introduction
This essay examines the effects of policy rigidity in a bioeconomic model, with emphasis
on the consequences for ﬁshery value, the optimal policy function, and stock collapse. In
this essay, policy rigidity is deﬁned as a management institution in which the control vari-
able (i.e. quota or Total Allowable Catch) is ﬁxed for the duration of a “short-term planning
period.” During this time, the managed stock may experience multiple growth shocks. Two
stylized facts about ﬁsheries management motivate this research. First, frequent adjustment
of policy has high direct and indirect transactions costs (Turner and Weninger, 2005; Singh
et al., 2006). Policy rigidity may be a direct choice of ﬁshery managers who are inﬂu-
enced by these high transactions costs (Table 2.1). Second, relative to terrestrial resources,
marine ﬁsh stocks are difﬁcult to measure and subject to large stochastic growth shocks;
stocks are assessed using combinations of ﬁshery-dependent and independent techniques
that require large amounts of time and money to perform. The scientiﬁc assessment process
may result in relatively long periods of time during which the manager lacks information
about the stock size (Table 2.2). Infrequent assessments may be a management strategy that
accounts for the allocation of scarce resources to scientiﬁc and management activities for
many species of ﬁsh. Without current information about the stock the manager must condi-
tion policy on expectations about stock sizes. Indirectly, the limited amount of information
possessed by managers may constrain them to adopt rigid policies. This management insti-
tution will reduce the present value of ﬁshery revenues; however, the opportunity costs of
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rigidity are not well understood. This research generalizes the Clark and Kirkwood (1986)
bioeconomic ﬁshery model by introducing a short-term planning period and examining
the tradeoffs between rigidity, information, and ﬁshery value that ﬁshery managers must
consider in the decision-making process.
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act (MSFCA), the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service (NMFS) provides biological and economic advice to regional Fish-
ery Management Councils that manage ﬁsh stocks in United States waters. The major
component of that advice is related to the appropriate level of harvest and set-asides that
account for scientiﬁc and management uncertainty. NMFS has produced guidance docu-
ments that interpret and operationalize the National Standards described in the MSFCA
(NMFS, 2008). Maximum Sustained Yield (MSY) is deﬁned as the largest long-run aver-
age yield of a stock, given ecological conditions and ﬁshing technology in use. Optimum
Yield (OY) is Congressionally deﬁned as MSY less allowances for social, economic, and
ecosystem considerations. Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) are catch levels which ac-
count for scientiﬁc uncertainty and must be less than OY. An Annual Catch Limit (ACL) is
a threshold catch level that must be less than ABC. Finally, Annual Catch Targets (ACTs)
are the target harvest rate of managers; these are less than ACLs and must account for man-
agement uncertainty. The ﬁndings of this research, particularly the relationship between
policy intervals and optimal harvest and extinction, can be used by managers to set some
of these biological reference points.
Economists have typically constructed bioeconomic models to examine optimal harvest
rates and value from a capital accumulation perspective (Clark, 1976; Reed, 1979; Clark
and Kirkwood, 1986; Conrad and Clark, 1987). Three types of uncertainty were incorpo-
rated into a bioeconomic ﬁshery model by Roughgarden and Smith (1996): growth, mea-
surement, and harvest uncertainty. The ﬁrst two types of uncertainty correspond to scien-
tiﬁc uncertainty, while harvest uncertainty is closely related to the management uncertainty
described in the MSFCA. Sethi et al. (2005) solve the model developed by Roughgarden
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and Smith (1996) and ﬁnd that stock measurement uncertainty produces the largest qual-
itative changes in optimal policy. Costello et al. (2001) examine the ability of a manager
to predict future growth stocks and ﬁnd that prediction of a “good” growth shock leads
to lower current harvests. A predicted good shock implies that the opportunity costs of
harvest are larger than typical. While counterintuitive from a conservation standpoint, a
prediction of a good shock indicates larger returns from allowing that stock to remain in
the ecosystem to grow.
In general, the optimal policy prescribed by a bioeconomic model is a function that
maps the state space to action space. After solving for the optimal policy function, economists
(implicitly) assume that this policy function is simply adopted. The actual level of harvest,
quota, or Total Allowable Catch is then set mechanistically when the uncertainty about the
the stock level is resolved. However, this rarely occurs in ﬁsheries management, especially
when that policy is a complex harvest function (Thompson, 1999). Instead, quota levels are
typically set through a bargaining and negotiation process; these quotas may be ﬁxed for a
period of multiple years. While rigid policy instruments have not been examined in bioe-
conomics models, capital rigidity has previously been incorporated in those models. Singh
et al. (2006) construct a two-stock model (ﬁshing capital and ﬁsh stock) to examine the im-
pact of capital rigidity on policy. In that model, capital cannot be removed instantaneously
and ﬁshing capital is speciﬁc to the industry. The major ﬁnding is that the manager must
balance the additional revenues of a very ﬂexible harvest policy against the costs of con-
stantly adjusting capital; Singh et al. (2006) describe this phenomenon as catch-smoothing.
Within the ﬁsheries management literature there has been recent interest in the value
of information about stock dynamics and the substitutability of management and scientiﬁc
activities. Hansen and Jones (2008) examine the tradeoffs between gathering scientiﬁc
information and management in a case study of the control of an aquatic pest. Mantyniemi
et al. (2009) examine the beneﬁts of correctly selecting the appropriate stock equation for
herring from a set of possible choices using a Bayesian framework. These concepts have
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also been explored in the economics literature; Saphores and Shogren (2005) use a real-
options framework to determine the optimal amount of information that should be gathered
before costly actions should be undertaken to control an invasive species.
Many of the key ﬁndings of stochastic ﬁshery models were developed by Reed (1979)
and Clark and Kirkwood (1986). Both models implicitly assume that the manager’s only
source of information is an assessment that is conducted prior to the beginning of the ﬁsh-
ing season. In Reed’s (1979) model, this assessment occurs after the growth shock has
occurred but before the policy is declared. This assessment perfectly measures the level of
the harvestable stock; the manager can set policy conditional on the harvestable stock. Not
surprisingly, the optimal policy is similar to the optimal policy when growth is determin-
istic and can be characterized as a constant target escapement policy1 (Conrad and Clark,
1987). When stock levels are higher than the target, the entire “surplus” is harvested. When
stock levels are lower, there is no harvest and the stock is allowed to recover to the target
escapement level. The assumption of “real-time” knowledge of the stochastic shock drives
this result and precludes the possibility of accidental extinction.
Clark and Kirkwood (1986) limit the information that the manager possesses by as-
suming that escapement, not harvestable stock, is assessed. A scientiﬁc assessment is per-
formed at time t, which perfectly measures St, the escapement at time t. Based on St and
knowledge of the stock dynamics, G�St), the manager selects the harvest quota qt for the
current harvesting season. St grows according to the growth equation into the harvestable
stock, Xt. Harvest occurs, producing the escapement in the next time period, St+1, and the
process repeats inﬁnitely. The manager’s discrete-time optimization problem is to select
1Escapement is amount of ﬁsh that has not been harvested in the previous period.
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the quota in order to maximize the present value of expected ﬁsheries revenues:
max
qt
∞�
t=0
δtpE[ht] (2.1)
Xt = ztG�St) (2.2)
St+1 = Xt − ht (2.3)
ht = min�qt� Xt} (2.4)
In this model, δ ∈ [0� 1) is the per-period discount factor, p is the output price, ht
is harvest, and zt is a multiplicative shock with known distribution φ�zt) that is centered
at unity. Uncertainty enters the model through a stochastic growth function in Equation
(2.2). In the terms of Regan et al. (2002), no distinction is made between natural variation,
inherent randomness, and measurement error in the growth function2. Equation (2.4) can
be interpreted as a feasibility restriction: because the manager does not know the level of
harvestable stock when the quota is declared the harvest must be the lesser of the quota or
the harvestable stock. If, due to a particularly bad growth shock, the declared quota is less
than or equal to the harvestable stock, the stock is driven to extinction. Once the quota is
set, the lesser of the quota or the entire stock is harvested3.
Clark and Kirkwood’s (1986) research advocates precaution when the level of uncer-
tainty is high and ﬁnds that the constant-escapement policy is sub-optimal. Because the
harvestable stock is not known when the quota is set, it is theoretically possible for the
manager to set a quota that is higher than the actual stock size and accidentally drive the
stock to extinction.
2While some of this uncertainty is irreducible, scientists and managers have some degree of control over
the uncertainty in the system. For example, additional data could be gathered and incorporated into biological
models, increasing the precision and accuracy of stock assessments.
3Clark and Kirkwood (1986) note that this may be an unrealistic assumption. Alternatively, they propose
that harvesting within a season will stop once an arbitrary lower bound, X , is achieved.
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2.2 Policy Rigidity and Uncertainty
The planning horizon for natural resource problems is typically an inﬁnite or arbitrarily
large number of years, the short-term planning period is deﬁned as a period of k years
during which the policy instrument is held constant. However, the manager still optimizes
the expected present value of the ﬁshery over an inﬁnitely long time horizon.
In this model, a scientiﬁc assessment is performed at time t, which perfectly measures
escapement, St. G
k�St� h� z) is the growth function that returns the escapement, St+k, at
the end of the short-term planning period4. The (k × 1) vectors h and z are the harvests
and growth shocks that occur during the short-term planning period. The vector of growth
shocks, z, has known probability distribution φ�z). The growth function Gk�·) is deﬁned
by k- applications of the G�·) as deﬁned in equation (2.2) on St.
Based on measured escapement and knowledge of the stock dynamics, the regulator
selects qj , a harvest quota that is in effect for each year in the j
th short-term planning
period. The other main assumptions of the Clark and Kirkwood model remain: harvest (h),
quota (q), and stock size (S) are assumed to be non-negative and E[φ�z)] = 1. The timing
of the Reed, Clark & Kirkwood, and the current model are presented in Figure 2.1.
For short-term planning period of length k, the manager maximizes the expected present
value of the ﬁshery by setting a quota, qj , which is held constant for the duration of the
short-term planning period.
max
q�
∞�
j=0
δkj
k�
i=1
δk�1pE[hi] (2.5)
4Since the planning period is k−years in length, St�k refers to the stock at the time k years or 1 planning
period in the future. More generally, St�mk refers to the stock at the timemk years orm planning periods in
the future.
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subject to:
St+k = G
k�St� h� z) (2.6)
Xt+i = zt+iG
1�St+i�1) ∀i (2.7)
hi = min[qj� Xi] ∀i� j (2.8)
The innovation of the model is contained in Equations (2.5) and (2.6). In equation (2.5), the
“inner” summation produces the discounted expected revenueswithin each short-term plan-
ning period, while the “outer” summation adds these discounted revenues across planning
periods. Equation (2.6) is the stochastic growth equation that maps the initial escapement
level (St), harvests (h), and stochastic shocks (z) to escapement at the end of the short-term
planning period (St+k).
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) function analogously to Equations (2.2) and (2.4) in the Clark
and Kirkwood’s (1986) model. Equation (2.7) describes the harvestable stock at any point
within the short-term planning period. Accidental extinction is possible because the har-
vestable stock of ﬁsh (X), is never measured by the manager. Equation (2.8) links the pol-
icy instrument to the stock equation: either the entire quota or the entire harvestable stock
is captured. Both the objective function (Equation 2.5) and the state-transition equation
(2.6) are likely to be non-linear in qj , suggesting that simple constant-escapement policies
are likely to be non-optimal. [XXX quick transition] The Bellman equation can be written
as:
J�t� St; k) = max
q�
�
k�
i=1
δ�i�1)pE[hi] + δ
kE[J�t+ k� St+k; k)]} (2.9)
The value function is written as a function of parameter k, the length of the short-term
planning period to make the dependence of J on this parameter more explicit. Solving the
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Bellman equation provides the following condition for positive quotas:
k�
i=1
[δi�1p
∂E[hi]
∂qj
] = δkE[
∂J
∂S
�t+ k�Gk�St� qj); k)]E[
∂Gk
∂qj
�St� qj)] (2.10)
Further algebraic manipulation of equation (2.10) is difﬁcult due to the expectations
operators and minimum function which deﬁnes hi. However, Equation (2.10) retains the
traditional “golden rule” interpretation of natural resource economics problems. When the
efﬁcient level of quota is positive, the marginal expected beneﬁts of quota (lhs) must be
equal to the (discounted) marginal expected costs (rhs). These expected costs are equal to
the value of the stock, multiplied by the change in stock productivity.
There are two models of interest that are nested within this bioeconomic model. First,
the Clark and Kirkwood model is a special case of this model in which k = 1. When φ�z)
is degenerate, the model corresponds to policy rigidity with deterministic growth. Second,
when stocks evolve deterministically, the manager’s optimization problem becomes much
simpler. Although the manager chooses qj , quota is always equal to harvest and accidental
extinction is ruled out. The deterministic optimization problem is:
max
q�
∞�
j=0
δkj
k�
i=1
δ�i�1)pqj (2.11)
s.t. St+k = G
k�St� qj).
While the objective function is linear in the control variable, the state transition equation
is linear in qj only if k = 1. Deﬁning a value function J�t� St; k) that is dependent only on
time and escapement provides:
J�t� St; k) = max
q�
�
k�
i=1
[δ�i�1)pqj] + δ
kJ�t+ k�Gk�St� qj); k)} (2.12)
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Solving the associated Bellman equation when harvesting is positive yields:
k�
i=1
[δi�1p] = δk
∂J
∂S
�t+ k�Gk�St� hj); k)
∂Gk
∂qj
�St� qj) (2.13)
The summation term on the left-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of increasing har-
vest levels within the short-term planning period. The right-hand side term captures the
marginal cost of increasing harvest levels: JS�·) is the marginal value of non-harvested
ﬁsh and Gkh�·) describes how escapement at the end of the planning period changes with
harvest. Optimal policy requires that the marginal beneﬁts of harvest are equal to marginal
costs of harvest. Appendix A illustrates the model in some depth for logistic growth with a
planning period of 2 years.
2.3 Methods
Numerical simulations are used to understand the effects of policy rigidity on ﬁsheries man-
agement. The goal of these simulations are to understand the combined effects of rigidity
and uncertainty on the value of ﬁsheries revenues, optimal policy, and the possibility of ex-
tinction. In order to isolate the effect of policy rigidity, a deterministic model with rigidity
is ﬁrst simulated. Next, the stochastic growth model with rigidity is simulated to examine
the combined effects of stochastic growth and rigidity. These simulations are repeated for
a range of biological parameters to better understand the sensitivity of the results to these
parameters.
The discrete-time, discrete-state dynamic programming problem is solved using Mi-
randa and Fackler’s (2002) COMPECON toolbox for MATLAB. Details about the numerical
methods can be found in Appendix B. A discrete-time approximation to logistic growth is
used; the single-year escapement equation is:
St+1 = G�St� zt� ht) = zt[rSt�1−
St
K
) + St]− ht� (2.14)
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The annual discount factor (δ) is set to 0.95, and price is normalized to unity. For a
short-term planning period greater than one year in length, repeated application of Equation
(2.14) generates the appropriate state equation (See Appendix B for an illustration). Unless
otherwise noted, the biological parameters,K and r are also set to unity. TheK parameter
is typically referred to as carrying capacity; without harvesting or stochastic growth, the
population would evolve to a steady state at K. The r parameter is known as the intrinsic
growth rate; for an arbitrarily-small, positive S, the stock grows at rate r. The speed at
which the stock moves to K is related to both r and the distance of the stock from K.
Under stochastic growth and no harvest, the stock will oscillate around K, with the size of
the oscillations related to all 3 parameters (r�K, and ε). The state equation is symmetric
with respect to K, which may be somewhat unrealistic. zt is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed from a uniform distribution with support [1− ε� 1 + ε], where ε
is varied on the range [0� 0.9].
Let q�S; k) be the quota function that solves equation (2.9) for a given policy interval k.
Similarly, let J�S� q�S; k); k) = J�S; k) be the optimized value of the equation (2.9). The
model is solved for both the optimal policy, q�S; k), and the corresponding expected value
of ﬁsheries revenues, J�S; k), for short-term planning periods of one, two and three years
in length (k = 1� 2� 3). The level of growth uncertainty and the length of the short-term
planning period are treated as parameters in the model. By examining the sensitivity of
the value function to changes in those parameters, it is possible to examine the costs and
beneﬁts of alternative management institutions. For example, holding all other parame-
ters constant, changes in the length of the short-term planning period, k, give insight into
the costs of different management institutions and the possible economic gains from ﬂex-
ible management. Similarly, changes in ε provide insight into the value of more accurate
knowledge of stock dynamics.
17
2.4 Results and Discussion
When stock growth is deterministic, policy rigidity has only a minimal effect on the value of
ﬁshery revenues. The percentage difference in the present value of stock S under different
planning periods can be written as:
ΔJlm =
J�S; l)− J�S;m)
J�S; l))
Figure 2.2 plots ΔJlm for l = 1 and m = 2� 3. When growth is deterministic, rigidity pro-
duces only small decreases in the value of the ﬁshery. Intuition for this result can be drawn
from deterministic ﬁshery models: when stocks evolve deterministically, the constant es-
capement target rule and Most Rapid Approach Path are optimal (Conrad and Clark, 1987).
Once the target escapement level is achieved, rigidity cannot have an impact on either pol-
icy or the ﬁshery value. The effects of rigidity are conﬁned to the k−year transition to the
target escapement level. The reductions in the value function are the consequence of mov-
ing “too slowly” to that escapement level. With policy rigidity, the deterministic ﬁshery
also takes the Most Rapid Approach Path to the target escapement. However, this is the
length of the short-term planning period, k-years, instead of a single year. In contrast to
a model with deterministic growth, stochastic growth can produce large economic losses
under policy rigidity. The relative decrease in ﬁshery revenues is robust to the initial stock
size �S0); for this set of biological and economic parameters evaluated, policy rigidity pro-
duces economic losses of twenty or thirty percent when two- or three-year planning periods
are used and ε = 0.5.
The sensitivity of the ﬁshery value to uncertainty is examined in Figure 2.3 by plotting
the optimized value, J�S0 = 0.5; k), as a function of ε, the uncertainty parameter
5. The
vertical distance between curves in Figure 2.3 is the change in ﬁshery value that can be
5When stock growth is deterministic, S0 = �.5 is the biomass that produces the Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY) for this set of parameters. This stock level is commonly referred to as B�SY . Using initial
values of S0 = �.2� �.8, and 1 does not produce qualitatively different results.
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attributed to policy rigidity. Consider a ﬁshery for which ε = 0.5 and policy is set every
two years (point A). Adoption of ﬂexible management institutions would move the ﬁshery
to point B, increasing the value of the ﬁshery. Rigidity always reduces the value of the
ﬁshery; this effect is fairly small when stock growth uncertainty is either low or extremely
high. However, at moderate and large levels of uncertainty, policy rigidity causes fairly
large economic losses. This result suggests that rigid policies are best utilized when stock
dynamics are well known and subject to little natural variation.
Movements along a curve in Figure 2.3 represent changes in ﬁshery value due to changes
in the amount of uncertainty in the stock growth equation. The uncertainty parameter (ε)
may be partially under the control of ﬁsheries managers (Regan et al., 2002). For example,
additional scientiﬁc effort may increase the knowledge of the growth function, effectively
reducing ε. Reductions in ε always lead to higher value of the ﬁshery. If uncertainty in the
growth function is reduced from ε = 0.5 to ε = 0.4, this would move the ﬁshery from point
A to point C, increasing the value of the ﬁshery. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are analogous ﬁgures
for r = 0.5 and r = 1.5 respectively. The general shapes of the curves in Figures 2.3-2.5
are very similar, changes in r appear to scale the value of the ﬁshery.
While the manager must ﬁx the quota level for the duration of the short-term planning
period, the causes that drive the use of a rigid policy lead to slightly different interpretations
of these ﬁgures. When policy rigidity is a direct choice of managers, changes in ﬁshery
value directly reﬂect the opportunity costs of policy rigidity: Figures 2.3-2.5 make the
opportunity costs of those decisions clear and highlight the biological parameters for which
those institutions are particularly costly. Holding the level of uncertainty constant, these
simulations suggest that stocks with a high intrinsic growth rates (r) relative to K will see
the largest decline in ﬁshery value when using rigid policy.
The model is consistent with an alternative interpretation: an informational constraint
on decision-making due to infrequent stock assessments. If stock assessments are per-
formed every k-years but policy adjusted more frequently, then managers are indirectly
19
constrained to set policy infrequently as well. The manager only knows the probability
distribution from which the shocks are drawn. During years when stock assessments are
not performed, managers are unable to condition quota on the most recent escapement
level. Instead, they must use expectations of stock levels to set policy; this is equivalent
to declaring a multi-year policy at the time that the stock assessment is performed. Under
this interpretation, Figures 2.3-2.5 can provide insight into the implied tradeoffs between
speed and precision in the scientiﬁc and management activities. Suppose that there are two
types of recurring scientiﬁc activities that can be used to learn about stock dynamics. The
ﬁrst type can be undertaken rapidly; however, it is associated with larger errors in the stock
equation (ε is larger). The second type of activity takes longer amounts of time; however,
it can explain more the stock dynamics. While assessment and management costs are not
modeled directly in this research, the relative costs and beneﬁts of either approach can be
examined in Figures 2.3-2.5.
Figure 2.6 plots the elasticity of the value function with respect to the growth uncer-
tainty for a stock with biological parameters r = 1 and K = 1.6. This elasticity peaks
when uncertainty is fairly high. The location of this peak is slightly sensitive to the length
of the planning period and occurs at lower levels of uncertainty when k is larger. This high-
lights the tradeoffs inherent in this bioeconomic model; for moderate and large amounts
of uncertainty, there are increasing returns to increasing knowledge of the stock growth
equation, the elasticity is much larger than unity. However, the elasticity of uncertainty
drops below unity at fairly large levels of uncertainty. For values of ε less than this critical
point, further reductions in uncertainty produce decreasing returns. At these lower levels of
uncertainty, it may be optimal to adjust policy faster instead of focusing on reducing stock
growth uncertainty. The exact location of the point at which this occurs depends on the
opportunity costs of uncertainty in Figure 2.3 and the costs of scientiﬁc research, which are
not explored in this essay.
6This is approximated as η = ΔV
Δε
ε
V
.
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The optimal quota, conditional on a set of biological parameters and the amount of
rigidity in the system, may be associated with a positive probability of extinction or col-
lapse. As noted by Clark (1973), certain combinations of biological growth and economic
parameters imply that immediate harvest of the entire stock is optimal; however, these sets
of biological and economic parameters are not considered in these simulations. Surpris-
ingly, extinction has received limited attention in the stochastic ﬁshery models; many of
the stochastic ﬁshery models are based on Reed’s (1979) ﬁshery model, which precludes
extinction.
Simulation of the state path is used to gain insight into the probability of extinction.
Using an initial value of (S0 = 0.5), the path of the ﬁshery regulated by the optimal policy
is simulated 1,000,000 times for a 100-year period at varying levels of policy rigidity and
uncertainty. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the probabilities that a stock with given parame-
ters will be extinct within a 100 year period under standard (r = 1) and low (r = 0.5)
intrinsic growth rates. These simulations ﬁnd that extinction does not occur when rigidity
is not present unless uncertainty is extremely high. However, when the stock is managed
with a rigid policy instrument, extinction may occur in the presence of moderate levels of
uncertainty.
When the optimal policy is associated with a positive probability of extinction, it is
difﬁcult to classify extinction events as either accidental or purposeful. By deﬁnition, the
optimal policy, q, maximizes the discounted expected revenues in Equation (2.5). These
probabilities of extinction are a result of an optimization process in which the manager is
risk neutral, discounts future ﬁshery revenues at a positive rate, and faces no additional
penalty from extinction beyond the inability to harvest the stocks. In this model, a positive
probability of extinction is accepted in return for higher harvests; this is a byproduct of
managing stocks under policy rigidity with limited information. These ﬁndings may par-
tially explain historical ﬁsheries collapse when stock growth is not well understood (ε is
high) or if quota levels are infrequently adjusted (k is high). If stock levels are measured
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infrequently or quota levels cannot be updated quickly, the extinction occurs with fairly
high probability, even if quota is chosen optimally. This highlights the need for timely,
accurate assessment and management activities.
Two interesting features of the optimal quota function are illustrated in Figure 2.7. The
optimal quota function is symmetric about the carrying capacity; this result is driven by the
symmetry of the growth equation that is used. Healthy stock levels that are near carrying
capacity indicate that future stock levels will also be fairly high. Unhealthy stock levels
that are far from the carrying capacity indicate that future stock levels will be low. Because
of the symmetry of the growth equation, both very low (S near 0) and very high (S near
2K) are unhealthy and will lead to low expected stock levels in the next time period. When
stock levels are healthy, rigidity leads to precautionary quota levels; the optimal quota under
under rigid management is less than the optimal quota for ﬂexible management. However,
this result is reversed for the relatively small interval that correspond to either extremely
low or high stock levels. When constrained to use a rigid policy, the ﬁshery manager prefers
slightly higher quota levels over these intervals.
There is also a threshold stock level at which the ﬁshery is closed. This level depends on
the level of rigidity used to manage the ﬁshery. Both ﬁndings can be partially explained by
the way that rigidity is modeled; for computational purposes the quota levels are required
to be constant during the entire short-term planning period. When rebuilding a stock from
unhealthy levels under rigidity, a low level of harvesting is preferred to zero harvest. These
results are also consistent with Singh et al.’s (2006) ﬁnding that capital rigidity in the ﬁshery
produces “catch-smoothing.”
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the effect of a single modiﬁcation, policy rigidity, to a bioe-
conomic ﬁsheries model with uncertainty. A few stylized facts about management under
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policy rigidity emerge. Rigidity has limited impact when stock growth uncertainty is small
and no practical impact when stock growth is deterministic. However, both optimal pol-
icy and the value of ﬁsheries revenues are highly sensitive to management rigidity when
growth is highly stochastic. These results suggest that rigid policies, if they must be used,
should be conﬁned to stocks where the dynamics are well understood and subject to little
variation. The combination of rigidity and stochastic growth can have large consequences
for ﬁshery collapse or extinction, even when managed to maximize the net present value of
the ﬁshery. When managers are unable to respond quickly to growth shocks, either because
they are unmeasured or because of rigidity in management, the present value of the ﬁshery
decreases and the probability of collapse increases, sometimes dramatically. These ﬁndings
advocate for the explicit consideration for the speed at which policy itself can meaningfully
be changed when setting ﬁsheries policy.
The model as formulated requires the manager to select a harvest level that is constant
within the short-term planning period. This strong assumption about the type of rigidity is
made for computational simplicity to reduce the dimensionality of the dynamic program-
ming problem. However, a weaker version policy rigidity is possible. Under this “weak
rigidity,” the quota level is not necessarily constant for the duration of short-term planning
period; instead, it must only be declared at the beginning of the short-term planning period.
For example, consider a stock that grows deterministically and is far below the desired
level. Under the strict deﬁnition of policy rigidity employed in the paper, the optimal pol-
icy may be to harvest at a constant low level for the duration of the short-term planning
period that produces a target escapement level at the end of that period. However, under
a weaker version of rigidity, optimal policy may be to close the ﬁshery for a portion of
the short-term planning period and then allow a higher harvest level short-term planning
period.
The model of rigidity in this essay is similar to the managment procedure for Atlantic
Herring (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2007). In the Northeast
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United States, the major components of the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan,
including Total Allowable Catch, are speciﬁed every three years. Historically, these have
been constant for those three years; however, this is not mandatory. During the three year
planning period, adjustments are possible if warranted by new information. However, new
information can only be obtained by the manager at infrequent intervals; stock assessments
are performend infrequently (Table 2.2).
The bioeconomic model, as formulated, allows instantaneous biological extinction - if
quota levels are mistakenly set above the actual stock size, the ﬁshery collapses immedi-
ately. Immediate biological extinction is unlikely in practice; at a depleted stock level,
ﬁshing would become unproﬁtable and the directed ﬁshery would shut down for economic
reasons. Interpretation of biological extinction in this model as end of a viable commer-
cial ﬁshery is more realistic. With limited information or ability to control harvest, a stock
may be quickly reduced to levels at which a large-scale, directed ﬁshery is no longer prof-
itable. This research suggests that stocks which grow slowly, are susceptible to large growth
shocks, or are monitored infrequently may be particularly vulnerable to commercial extinc-
tion. The Atlantic Halibut ﬁshery in the northeast United States is an historical example of
this phenomenon (Col and Legault, 2009; Grasso, 2008). This species grows slowly and
was subject to intense ﬁshing in the mid 1800s, resulting in stock collapse by the 1870s.
Both stock size and harvest rates are currently very low and rebuilding of the halibut stock
is complicated because it is a bycatch species in the bottom trawl ﬁshery.
The model used in this essay has abstracted away from costly harvesting in order to
isolate the effect of policy rigidity. This assumption may be non-trivial; if harvest is costly
and depends on the stock level, then observation of the costs of harvest in real-time could
increase the manager’s information about current stock levels. If the cost or production
function is known, managers could use this relationship to determine stock sizes (Smith
et al., 2009). However, this would require large amounts of information and it is unclear
whether these data could be used in a timely manner. It is certainly possible that analysis of
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economic data requires as much, if not more, time as analysis of ﬁsheries population data.
While this research shows that policy rigidity reduces the value of the ﬁshery, there are
beneﬁts to rigidity that are not incorporated in the model. Firstly, both stock assessments
and management activities are costly; there is likely to be an optimal mix of scientiﬁc and
management activities that should be performed (Hansen and Jones, 2008). The precise
point at which this occurs depends on the production of scientiﬁc knowledge about the
stocks of ﬁsh, which is beyond the scope of this research. Secondly, the avoidance of the
capital adjustment and other transactions costs studied by Singh et al. (2006) may be an
important beneﬁt of managing ﬁsh stock using a rigid policy instrument.
2.6 Tables and Figures
Short-Term Landings Value
Species Planning Period (1,000s mt) (�M)
Sea Scallop 2 years 27 �385
Atlantic Herring 2 years 73 �19
Skates 2 years 13 �7
Red Crab 2 years 1 �3
Ocean Quahog 3 years 15 �19
Tileﬁsh 3 years 1 �4
Spiny Dogﬁsh 3 years 3 �1
Table 2.1: Short-Term Planning Period length, landings, and value for selected stocks in
the Northeast United States.
Atlantic Herring Cod (Georges Bank) Sea Scallop
2008 2008 2006
2006 2005 2004
Year 2003 2002 2001
1998 2001 1999
1996 2000 1997
Table 2.2: Recent stock assessments dates for select ﬁsheries in the Northeast United States.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of actions in the Reed (top), Clark and Kirkwood (middle), and Lee
(bottom) bioeconomic models.
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Figure 2.2: The impact of policy rigidity and stochastic growth on the present value of
ﬁshery revenues. Logistic stock growth with r = 1� K = 1 ,and δ = .95.
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Figure 2.3: Present value of Fishery Revenues for one-, two-, and three-year planning pe-
riods. Point A corresponds to a ﬁshery which is managed using a 2 year planning period
and ε = 0.5. Point B is a ﬁshery which is managed using a 1 year planning period with
the same level of uncertainty. Point C is a ﬁshery which is managed using a 2 year plan-
ning period with ε = 0.4. The vertical distance between A and B can be attributed to
policy rigidity while the vertical distance between A and C can be attributed to scientiﬁc
uncertainty. Stock growth is logistic with r = 1� K = 1, δ = .95, and S0 = 0.5.
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Figure 2.4: Present value of Fishery Revenues for one-, two-, and three-year planning
periods. Stock growth is logistic with r = .5� K = 1, δ = .95, and S0 = 0.5. A reduction
in r shifts the present value of ﬁshery values downward.
29
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ε
P
re
se
nt
 V
al
ue
 o
f F
is
he
ry
 R
ev
en
ue
s
 
 
k=1
k=2
k=3
Figure 2.5: Present value of Fishery Revenues for one-, two-, and three-year planning
periods. Stock growth is logistic with r = 1.5� K = 1, δ = .95, and S0 = 0.5. An increase
in r shifts the present value of ﬁshery values upwards.
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Figure 2.6: The elasticity of the Present Value of Fishery Revenues with respect to stock
growth uncertainty (ε) calculated at S0 = 0.5. Stock growth is logistic with r = 1� K = 1,
δ = .95.
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Figure 2.7: Optimal quota �qj) for one-, two-, and three-year planning periods. Stock
growth is Logistic with r = 1� K = 1 and δ = .95.
32
ε 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
k = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.999
k = 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.168 0.430 0.657 0.989 1.000
k = 3 0.000 0.000 1.2x10�4 0.045 0.181 0.409 0.643 0.852 1.000 1.000
Table 2.3: Probability of Extinction within 100 years. Logistic stock growth with r =
1� K = 1� δ = 0.95.
ε 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
k = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.756 0.993
k = 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.100 0.362 0.728 0.989 1.000
k = 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.121 0.365 0.666 0.943 0.999 1.000
Table 2.4: Probability of Extinction within 100 years. Logistic stock growth with r =
0.5� K = 1� δ = 0.95.
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Chapter 3
Bargaining for Homogeneous Goods:
The Days­at­Sea Market
3.1 Introduction
This chapter adapts Harding et al.’s (2003) hedonic pricing model to examine bargaining
power in the Days-at-Sea (DAS) market. The DAS effort control system was implemented
in 1994 as a means to end overﬁshing and allow depleted stocks of groundﬁsh in the North-
east United States to recover. This ﬁshery has historically been managed with an input
control system and target or “soft” Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Fishing vessels were al-
located a maximum number of ﬁshing days per year based on historical patterns of use.
In 2004, the DAS system was converted to a tradable input control system; however, reg-
ulations on trades may have limited the ability of the market to efﬁciently allocate DAS.
The most restrictive trading regulations are likely to be the length and power limitations
for trading pairs that were designed to limit increases in ﬁshing power. Furthermore, there
is no centralized market for DAS, trades are facilitated through brokers and prices are not
publicly posted. Despite these limitations, there is robust activity in this market for DAS.
From 2004 to 2008, there were 2,349 transactions in this market; approximately 53,400
Days-at-Sea worth �17.9M have been exchanged (Table 3.1). During the 2008 ﬁshing
year, over one in four used DAS were leased. There has also been tremendous variation
in prices of DAS and a lack of convergence to a single price (Figure 3.1). Furthermore,
there has been excess allocation of DAS; the yearly aggregate allocation of DAS has never
been approached. Economic theory claims that value of excess supply should be equivalent
to zero; however, the market appears to be characterized by both large amounts of excess
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DAS and positive prices.
The ﬁndings of this chapter suggest that this phenomenon can be explained by regu-
latory segmentation. The trading restrictions based on length and power have carved the
DAS market into many smaller markets with few participants in each market. Some of
these markets may clear at a positive price while others do not. Because a centralized mar-
ket does not exist and there may be few participants in each market, trades are analyzed
in a bilateral bargaining framework (Blair et al., 1989). In this model, the two ﬁrms ﬁrst
select the allocation of DAS that maximizes joint proﬁts, then split the surplus using price.
Price does not serve as a rationing mechanism; instead, it transfers trade surplus between
parties.
This research is important and timely for multiple reasons. Firstly, National Standard
4 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act (MSFCA) prohibits the acquisition
of “excessive share” in limited access ﬁsheries. This generally has been interpreted by
economists as a prohibition on market power, in either the permit or output market (Ander-
son, 2008). The ﬁndings of this chapter suggest that exertion of market power by certain
types of individuals has occured in this market. Secondly, ﬁsheries managers were con-
cerned with the effects of tradability on increases in total catch due to efﬁciency gains, the
viability of small ﬁshing vessels, and the preservation of ﬂeet diversity. Small vessels are
believed to be less efﬁcient than large vessels; transfer of DAS to more efﬁcient vessels
would increase aggregate catch, an undesirable outcome. The continued operation of small
vessels was viewed as a desirable social outcome. The ﬁndings of this research suggest that
the trading regulations lowered the bargaining power of smaller vessels in the DAS market.
The applied research in bargaining and market power can be split into two general
ﬁelds. The ﬁrst type of analysis is primarily concerned with detecting the exertion of mar-
ket power and often uses industry level time-series data. Fell and Haynie (In Press) examine
the relationship between harvesters and processors in the Alaskan sableﬁsh ﬁshery. After
an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) system was implemented, the bargaining power of har-
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vesters increased relative to processors. Raper et al. (2000) examine bilateral bargaining in
the US tobacco market. The authors apply an econometric model that allows for exertion
of market power by either party to a time-series of input and output prices and ﬁnd that
buyers in this market are exerting market power relative to sellers. Gervais and Devadoss
(2006) apply this general framework to chicken producers and processors. Mouchart and
Vandresse (2007) recognize that the characteristics of each contract are endogenous to the
bargaining processing for transportation contracts. Instead of an industry-level regression
approach, the authors examine individual contracts using a frontier analysis approach to
construct supply and demand bid functions and measures of bargaining power.
A second class of literature has attempted to identify attributes of individuals, ﬁrms,
or contracts that are associated with high or low bargaining power. Ayres and Siegelman
(1995) implement an audit study of bargaining for new cars and ﬁnd that black and fe-
male buyers were quoted higher prices. Harless and Hoffer (2002) use transactions data to
reinvestigate bargaining for new cars. The authors cannot replicate the ﬁnding that female
buyers pay more, although they cannot control for race in the analysis. Examination of bar-
gaining power has recently been popular in the hedonic housing literature, beginning with
Harding et al.’s (2003) innovative bargaining model. The authors examine the causes of
bargaining power by incorporating demographic characteristics that may confer bargain-
ing power into the hedonic pricing model. The authors are particularly concerned with
model misspeciﬁcation due to omitted variable bias. The X matrix of characteristics of
the heterogeneous good is partitioned as [X1 | X2]. X1 are observed; however X2 are not
observed, but possibly correlated with with either buyer or seller demographics (Ds� Db).
The hedonic price equation is initially speciﬁed as:
p = X1β1 +X2β2 + b
bDb + bsDs. (3.1)
The bi terms are intended to capture shifts in prices due to bargaining power differences
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that are derived from demographic characteristics of the buyer and seller. When X2 is not
observed, estimating a model based on Equation (3.1) results in biased estimates of the bi
parameters due to the correlation between X2 and the D
i terms. To remove the omitted
variable bias, Harding et al. (2003) instead formulate the price equation as:
p = X1β + b
bDb + dbDb + bsDs + dsDs + ε. (3.2)
The di terms capture the correlations between X2 and the D terms; however, direct es-
timation of Equation (3.2) cannot identify the parameters of interest. Harding et al. (2003)
make two identifying assumptions:
bb = −bs = b Bargaining Power Equality (3.3)
db = ds = d Preference Equality (3.4)
Equation (3.3) requires that identical buyers and sellers have identical bargaining power.
Equation (3.4) requires that identical buyers have identical preferences for the unobservable
characteristics. Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are then substituted into equation (3.2) to produce
the estimating equation:
p = Xβ + b�Db −Ds) + d�Db +Ds) + ε (3.5)
Equation (3.5) augments the traditional hedonic price equation with vectors of sums
and differences of demographic characteristics. The coefﬁcient vector associated with the
demographic differences (b) captures bargaining power effects. The coefﬁcient vector asso-
ciated with the demographic sums �d) captures the effects of unobservable good character-
istics that are correlated with buyers and seller demographic characteristics. There are three
drawbacks with using this method. First, identiﬁcation assumptions of bargaining power
and preference equality must hold. For the housing market, these seem to be very reason-
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able identiﬁcation assumptions. Second, the estimated coefﬁcients can be slightly difﬁcult
to understand and interpret. Finally, the data must have sufﬁcient variation between buyer
and seller demographics in order to estimate the b coefﬁcients with precision.
This model has been frequently used to analyze price formation in real estate. Colwell
and Munneke (2006) apply the model to commercial property noting that the b terms may
be capturing market imperfections while dmay reﬂect different (unobservable) “classes” or
market segments in which types prefer to be active. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2009) ﬁnd that
race is a determinant of sale price of Florida houses. Cotteleer et al. (2008) argue that the
b terms are more properly characterized as “personal characteristics.” They claim that the
preference equality assumption in equation (3.4) is restrictive. Instead of using Equations
(3.3) and (3.4) to identify bi and di, the authors assume that there are no omitted charac-
teristics in their estimating equation that are correlated with both price and demographic
characteristics (db = ds = 0). Therefore, buyer and seller demographics can enter the esti-
mating equation directly. This identiﬁcation assumption is not econometrically testable.
3.2 The Days­at­Sea Market
There are thirteen species and twenty-four separate stocks of groundﬁsh which are managed
jointly in the Northeast United States. These include both round (cod, haddock) and ﬂat
ﬁsh (ﬂounders). Of these stocks, thirteen are classiﬁed as overﬁshed and overﬁshing is
currently occurring in ﬁve of the stocks (NMFS, 2008)1. These ﬁsh are caught by a diverse
ﬁshing ﬂeet that uses a wide variety of ﬁshing gear (otter trawls, gillnets, and hook-and-
line) and ﬁshing locations. The ﬁshery is a a joint, multiproduct ﬁshery (Squires, 1987;
Kirkley and Strand, 1988). Labor is compensated using the lay or share system; employees
receive a share of total revenue, after deducting variable operating costs (McConnell and
1When a stock of ﬁsh is “too small”, it is overﬁshed. When the ﬂow of ﬁsh being harvested is “too high”,
overﬁshing is occurring. Neither an overﬁshed stock nor the occurrence of overﬁshing necessarily implies
the other.
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Price, 2006). The exact share percentages and deﬁnitons of variable operating costs vary by
vessel. The vessels that participate in the groundﬁsh ﬁshery typically participate in other
ﬁsheries in the Northeast United States, including the scallop, monkﬁsh, lobster, and small
pelagic ﬁsheries. Some of these species are caught jointly with groundﬁsh.
Days-at-Sea (DAS) has been the primary management tool used to reduce ﬁshing effort
directed at groundﬁsh in the Northeast United States2. In 1996, there were approximately
1,700 vessels with an aggregate allocation of approximately 236,000 DAS (Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, title 50, Part 648, 2004). Substantial reductions in DAS were made so
that by 2004, there were 1,400 vessels with a permit to ﬁsh 44,000 DAS, although not ev-
ery permitted vessel had a DAS allocation. Leasing has become increasingly important;
by 2008 over 40 percent of all used DAS were leased (Table 3.1). Although input con-
trols have long been known to be an economically inefﬁcient management tool (Wilen,
1979; Townsend, 1985), these management instruments have been popular in the ﬁshing
and ﬁshery management communities (Rossiter and Stead, 2003).
At the beginning of the ﬁshing year (May 1), vessels are allocated a stock of DAS which
may be used at any time during the year. These DAS are similar to call options; a ﬁshing
vessel that owns a Northeast Multispecies DAS has the right to ﬁsh for groundﬁsh in the
Northeast United States federal waters for certain period of time during the ﬁshing year.
Up to 10 unused DAS may be carried forward to the subsequent ﬁshing year. Surplus DAS,
beyond ten, expire at the end of the ﬁshing year on April 30 and are worthless. As options,
the value can be decomposed into a time-value component and an intrinsic value compo-
nent. The time-value component should decline to zero as the trade date approaches the end
of the ﬁshing year. DAS differ slightly from traditional options; the intrinsic value of the
option varies across ﬁshing vessels and is based on the ﬁshing technology and other vessel
characteristics. A vessel that chooses to sell DAS believes that the expected value from
ﬁshing is less than market price. A vessel that chooses to buy believes that the expected
2Other regulatory tools in use include daily trip limits for certain species, both permanent and rolling area
closures, and minimum mesh sizes.
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value from ﬁshing is higher than market price.
Trades may occur at any time except the ﬁnal month of the ﬁshing year3. Prices and
quantity traded must be reported to the National Marine Fisheries Service4. However,
traded prices and quantities are not publicly available, limiting price discovery process
and possibly affecting the market equilibration process (Anderson, 2004). The primary
restriction on trade is related to ﬁshing power:
A lessor may not lease DAS to any vessel with a baseline horsepower rating
that is 20 percent or more greater than that of the horsepower baseline of the
lessee vessel. A lessor also may not lease DAS to any vessel with a baseline
[length] that is 10 percent or more greater than that of the baseline of the lessee
vessel’s [length] (Code of Federal Regulations, title 50, Part 648).
Larger, more powerful vessels are believed to have higher catch rates, particularly for
mobile gear relative to ﬁxed or hook gear vessels. Furthermore, subleasing of DAS is pro-
hibited. Combined with the size and power restrictions, the subleasing prohibition prevents
“ratcheting,” in which Days-at-Sea are successively transferred from small vessels to large
vessels. However, this may also eliminate speculation and market-making activities, which
are thought to be important for markets to efﬁciently allocate resources. These two limita-
tions on trade are likely to prevent effort from shifting to larger, more efﬁcient vessels by
segmenting the DAS market in to many smaller sub-markets. Small vessels that desire to
acquire DAS and large vessels that wish to divest DAS have the largest number of potential
trading partners (Table 3.2). These types of ﬁrms may be able to exert market power in the
Days-at-Sea market. Conversely, the largest buyers and the smallest sellers have the fewest
number of potential trading partners and may have minimal bargaining power. There are
two additional restrictions on trade which may reduce the ability of the market to efﬁciently
3These trades are technically leases - DAS are transferred for a single ﬁshing year. While permanent
transfer of DAS is allowed, these are infrequent and are not examined in this essay.
4A sample lease reporting form is available at http://www�nero�noaa�gov/permits/forms�
html
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allocate DAS. An upper limit on the number of DAS that a vessel can acquire was set at a
vessel’s 2001 DAS allocation, which may constrain the maximum number of days ﬁshed
by some of the most efﬁcient vessels. Because there is no centralized market, trading part-
ners are found by word-of-mouth, advertisement in ﬁshing-speciﬁc newspapers, or through
brokers who match buyers to sellers.
A Day-at-Sea permit initially allowed ﬁshing for a 24- hour period; however, there two
major changes in ﬁshery policy during the 2006 ﬁshing year that changed the deﬁnition of
a Day-at-Sea. The New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) desired lower
ﬁshing mortality during the 2006 ﬁshing year. However, the regulatory process could not
be completed by the beginning of the ﬁshing year. For approximately six months of the
ﬁshing year (May 1, 2006 to Nov 21, 2006), management of the the groundﬁsh ﬁshery
proceeded under an Emergency Action. All vessels ﬁshing for groundﬁsh were charged
1.4 DAS for each day that was actually used. This Emergency Action was a temporary
means to reduce ﬁshing effort and harvest while the regulatory process was being ﬁnished.
At the beginning of the 2006 ﬁshing year, the exact speciﬁcations and effective date of the
new regulations were not known with perfect certainty. However, ﬁshermen probably had
reasonably good predictions based on the extensive public notice given by the NEFMC.
Georgianna et. al ( 2008) found that New Bedford based ﬁshing vessels substituted non-
DAS trips for DAS trips and delayed use of their DAS during the 2006 ﬁshing year, waiting
for a more favorable accounting rate. However, the timing of use at an aggregate level does
not appear to have changed (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
The permanent change to groundﬁsh policy was titled Framework Adjustment 42 and
published on October 23, 2006 with implementation date of Nov 22, 2006. This regulation
created Differential DAS areas with heterogenous DAS costs (See Figure 3.2). Vessels that
used the Differential DAS areas were charged at a rate of two DAS for each day ﬁshed.
Fishing in other zones was charged at the normal rate (one-to-one). While ﬁshing vessels
are mobile and may be able to switch ﬁshing locations, there are limits to that mobility.
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Small vessels may not have be speed or size required to ﬁsh far off-shore, gear may be
suitable to certain ﬁshing areas, and crew many not have the knowledge required to use
unfamiliar ﬁshing areas. The differential DAS regulation contained in Framework Adjust-
ment 42 can be thought of as a downward technological shock to the production function
of ﬁshing vessels that use differential Days-at-Sea areas. Fishing vessels that use the Dif-
ferential Days-at-Sea areas will produce less revenue per DAS while those outside this area
should be unaffected.
3.3 Empirical Model and Data Used
In the present application, the traded good confers the right to ﬁsh for a period of time.
Harding et al. (2003) make the assumption that buyer and seller demographics confer
bargaining power equally and that identical types (as measured by demographics) have
identical preferences. These identiﬁcation assumptions are made because the authors are
concerned about omitted variable bias. A Northeast Multispecies Day-at-Sea has a well-
speciﬁed legal deﬁnition that is consistent across ﬁshing vessels. Prior to 2006, one DAS
allowed vessels to ﬁsh for one day. During the Emergency Action period, 1.6 DAS were
required for one ﬁshing day. After the implementation of Framework 42, a DAS allowed
vessels to ﬁsh at a a 1:1 ratio in the normal DAS areas or a 2:1 ratio in the differential
DAS areas. While the legal deﬁnition of DAS has change over time and currently varies
according to ﬁshing area, there are no unobserved attributes of a DAS. the ds and db terms
in equation (3.1) must be zero and the assumption of bargaining power equality in equation
(3.3) can be safely relaxed. The price equation can be estimated by OLS as:
pi = b
bDbi + b
sDsi + γZ + �i (3.6)
The demographic characteristics of buyers and sellers can enter the price equation di-
rectly and bargaining-power symmetry can be tested econometrically. For demographic
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Dj , rejection of the hypothesis that b
b
j = −b
s
j can be interpreted as evidence that charac-
teristic Dj confers bargaining power asymmetrically to buyers and sellers. Z is a vector of
controls that are not speciﬁc to either buyer or seller that may shift price.
The quantiles are modeled as linear. LetQτ �p|ZX) quantile of the distribution of Days-
at-Sea price, conditional on X , the buyer and seller demographic characteristics and other
price shifters. The conditional quantiles are modeled as:
Qτ �p|X) = X
�βτ (3.7)
For any τ ∈ �0� 1), the coefﬁcient vector β�τ) can be estimated by minimizing
1
n
n�
i=1
ρτ �pi −X
�
iβτ )
where
ρτ �u) = u�τ − I�u < 0))
For a given quantile, τ , the ρτ �u) function can be interpreted a function that incorporates
asymmetric weights on the residuals that depend on the sign of those residuals.
OLS focuses on the conditional mean and imposes slope homogeneity - the partial
effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable is assumed to be constant. In
contrast, quantile regression allows the estimated coefﬁcients to vary across the ranking
of the dependent variable (Koenker and Bassett Jr., 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
Using this method, it is possible to examine bargaining power across the distribution of
DAS prices. The restrictions on trade may have segmented the large market for DAS into
many small ones, each with few participants. Small changes in length or horsepower may
have large effects on bargaining power. The bargaining power effects are likely to be most
pronounced at both tails of the price distributions and quantile regression is able to uncover
those effects.
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The unit of observation in this analysis is a reported trade of a quantity of Days-at-Sea
that occurred in ﬁshing years 2004-2008. There are 1,788 observations for which DASwere
exchanged at positive prices5. Demographic characteristics for buyers and sellers include
length, horsepower, revenues from DAS and alternative ﬁsheries, number of permits held,
ﬁshing gear used, and the amount of prior experience in this market. In general, vessels
that purchased DAS had higher revenues, more experience in the market, and were more
likely to ﬁsh using trawl gear and in the Differential DAS areas than the sellers (Table
3.3). Buyers were slightly shorter in length and had lower horsepower, a expected result
of the trading regulations pertaining to those two characteristics. In general, prices had a
downward intra-year trend with fairly large volatility (See Figure 3.1).
Revenues for DAS trips were aggregated at the yearly level and divided by the total
Days-at-Sea used to construct a per-day measure of revenues for buyers and sellers from
the groundﬁsh ﬁshery. The average revenue per-day, lagged one year, were used in the
estimation as a measure of proﬁtability. The decision to acquire or divest DAS is related
to proﬁtability, this is likely to be very closely related to revenue due to the share system
of labor compensation. The DAS revenue variables captures the trade surplus over which
the two parties bargain over. Because ﬁshing vessels are often active in other ﬁsheries,
two other variables were constructed to account for the opportunity costs of buying and
selling DAS. The ﬁrst variable directly measures daily revenue from alternative ﬁsheries;
this variable is constructed analogously to the DAS Revenue variable. The second variable
included is the number of other limited access permits held by each vessel. The Alternative
Revenue and Permits variables control for the opportunity costs of ﬁshing and are also
related to the trade surplus. Vessels with high alternative revenues and many limited access
permits have a relatively high opportunity cost using DAS; they have highly productive
alternative ﬁshing activities. All economic data (prices and revenues) was deﬂated using
5Of the 2,349 observed transactions, 561 transactions reported a price paid equal to zero. There were
an additional 115 transactions for which the price was less than �100. There may represent intra-company
trades, non-response, or indicate a catch-sharing agreement. Additionally, there are a few (n=7) outlying data
points for which the price is far higher that the rest of the sample.
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Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for unprocessed ﬁnﬁsh, with the base year
set to 2008.
For each transaction, the buyer’s and seller’s experience is constructed as the number
of times each party had previously participated in the DAS market. The expected effect of
this variable is unclear: frequent participants are likely to have an informational advantage
relative to infrequent participants which may translate to a bargaining power advantage.
However, experience may reﬂect self-selection into the market; buyers with exceptionally
high proﬁtability may be more likely to purchase DAS at any price. Similarly, sellers with
low productivity may be more likely to sell DAS at any price.
A dummy variable for the use of trawl gear is included in the model. Vessels that
use trawl gear are typically larger, more powerful, and catch more ﬁsh than vessels that
use long-line, hand-line, or gillnet gear. This variation is already captured in the variables
used; however, trawl vessels also have higher operating expenses, mostly due to higher
fuel usage. Although detailed variable cost information is not available at the vessel-level,
inclusion of a dummy variable for trawlers may capture the higher variable operating costs
associated with this type of gear.
Two variables are used to capture the possible the effects of the technological shock
imposed by Framework 42’s Differential Days-at-Sea regulations. The fraction of revenues
derived from trips in the differential DAS areas was constructed using locational data from
landings reports (Figure 3.2). This variable captures the relative importance of the Differ-
ential DAS areas for each ﬁshing vessel. A dummy variable was included for trades that
occur after Framework 42 was implemented; this variable is also interacted with the Dif-
ferential DAS fraction. Yearly dummy variables were also included in the estimated model
and based on the ﬁshing year (May-April). The variable “Time Remaining” constructed
from the reported trade date and is used to capture the time-value component of DAS. Ig-
noring carry-over to the next ﬁshing year, the value of unused DAS is zero on the ﬁnal day
of the ﬁshing year.
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A linear model is estimated using OLS on the full sample (N=1,788) and two subsam-
ples that drop prices over �3,000 and �1,500 respectively6. The model is then estimated
using the full sample using quantile regression for the 10th through 90th quantiles, at inter-
vals of 5%, using the quantreg package in R.
3.4 Results
The linear model ﬁt by OLS ﬁts moderately well; R2 ranges from 0.21 to 0.51 (Tables
3.4 and 3.5). Results seem to be sensitive to outlying data points. Estimated coefﬁcients
and signiﬁcance levels, particularly the Trawl Buyer, Permits Seller, Framework42, and
Framework42∗DDAS Buyer, are not stable across subsamples. Furthermore, inspection
of the residuals reveals that the model has some difﬁculty ﬁtting both the very high and very
low prices (Figure 3.5). These ﬁndings partially motivate the use of quantile regression.
Because buyer and seller demographic characteristics enter the estimating equation sep-
arately, it is possible to examine the Bargaining Power equality assumption. Bargaining
Power equality implies that coefﬁcients for buyer and seller demographic characteristics
sum to zero. Table 3.6 contains the linear combination bs + bb and t−statistics for demo-
graphic characteristics. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that Bargaining Power
equality does not hold. Postive values in Table 3.6 imply that increases in that characteristic
are associated with increases in DAS price and may be interpreted as increasing the relative
bargaining power of sellers. Negative values are associated with decreases in DAS price
and may be interpreted as increasing the relative bargaining power of buyers.
A major ﬁnding is that segmentation induced by the trading restriction on length con-
fers bargaining power unequally to buyers and sellers. The positive combination of coefﬁ-
cients for length implies that longer buyers have less bargaining power. Although there are
also trading restrictions based on horsepower; neither buyer nor seller power affect DAS
6The speciﬁcation presented standardize horsepower by dividing by vessel length. The appendix contains
a slightly different analysis that uses raw horsepower and monthly dummy variables.
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price. A somewhat surprising ﬁnding is that revenues-per-DAS have no effect on bargain-
ing power; however, there is moderate evidence that alternative ﬁshing revenue and limited
access permits increase the bargaining power of sellers. Finally, there is weak evidence
that use of the differential DAS areas either reduces the willingness-to-pay for DAS or
decreases the bargaining power of sellers after the implementation of differential DAS.
Utilization of the Differential DAS area by either buyer or seller prior to implemen-
tation of Framework 42 has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on bargaining power. The
implementation of Framework 42 may have increased price; however this results is not ro-
bust across models7. For the smallest subsample (Model 3), buyers that use the differential
Days-at-Sea will pay less after the implementation of Framework42. Vessels that heavily
utilize the differential DAS areas ﬁnd those areas less proﬁtable and therefore are willing
to pay less in order to ﬁsh there. It is plausible that the trade surplus decreased under
Framework 42, driving down prices.
The Time Remaining coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant, providing support for the
time-value component of Days-at-Sea valuation. The estimated coefﬁcient is relatively
stable across the three estimated models, ranging from �0.36-0.52 per day. The coefﬁcients
for yearly dummies are presented in Table 3.5. There were substantial price increases
in 2006-2008, relative to 2004. Real DAS prices were up to �200 higher in 2006-2008;
although the estimated coefﬁcients vary by speciﬁcation and year.
The quantile regression method can provide further insight into the bargaining process
beyond analysis of the conditional mean price. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 contain coefﬁcient es-
timates and standard errors for 5 selected quantiles along with Koenker and Machado’s
(1999) R1 statistic8. The model has little explanatory power at the lower tail of the price
7Based on Model 2, the sum of the F42xDifferential seller and Framework42 coefﬁcients is �77; however,
the standard error of that estimate is 52, indicating that it cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
Similarly, the sum of F42xDifferential buyer �40, with a standard error of 45, also not distinguishable from
zero.
8The R1 is an analog of the R2 statistic and is calculated as R1 = 1 − Vu
V�
, where Vu is the value of the
objective function produced by a “full regression” and Vc is the value of the objective function produced by
regression of price against only a constant.
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distribution; there is little variation in the dependent variable and prices are clustered just
above zero. Fit improves markedly at higher quantiles. Visualization is the easiest way to
interpret results of quantile regression; each of the estimated coefﬁcients, βτ , are plotted as
a function of τ , along with shaded 90% conﬁdence bands and a dotted line that represents
the OLS coefﬁcient estimate. The graphs and associated coefﬁcients can be interpreted as
the marginal effect of an independent variable on price at a given quantile. A line with
zero slope would be consistent with the slope-homogeneity restriction imposed by least
squares. Departures from zero slope imply that the marginal effects are different across
different price quantiles. Many, but not all of the coefﬁcient lines appear to have non-zero
slope.
These results are consistent with regulatory segmentation hypothesis based on length.
Length reduces the bargaining power of buyers; however, this effect is strongest at the
upper tail of the price distribution and non-existent at the lower tail. An extra foot of
buyer’s length increases the price of DAS by �5.20 at the 25th percentile and by �10 at
the 90th percentile (Figure 3.7). In addition, seller length has a similar, though smaller in
magnitude, effect on prices at the higher price quantiles (Figure 3.8). Power, as measured
by the horsepower/length ratio does not seem to impact the bargaining power of buyers
or sellers (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). Length, and not power, seems to be more restrictive in
determining feasible trades in this market.
Groundﬁsh revenues for both buyer and seller are related to the trade surplus over which
each party bargains. Buyer’s groundﬁsh revenue appears to have no effect on prices while
seller’s groundﬁsh revenues have a small effect, increasing price by approximately �7 per
�1,000 of daily revenues at all but the lowest price quantiles (Figures 3.11 and 3.12). The
effects of the alternative revenue and limited access permits are similar: conferring small
amounts of bargaining power to sellers at the low and moderate price quantiles (Figures
3.13 and 3.14) and having no effect on the bargaining power of buyers (Figures 3.15 and
3.16). These ﬁndings could indicate a gradient of market classes. There may be one market
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class for the large vessels; in this segment, size is an important determinant of price and
bargaining power. There is another market class for the smaller vessels; within this class,
the proﬁts and opportunity costs of the seller, as measured by Permits, DAS Revenue, and
Alternative Revenue become more important in the bargaining process.
Implementation of Framework 42’s Differential DAS system had an interesting effect
on prices and bargaining power. As expected, prior to the implementation of Framework
42, the bargaining power of vessels that used the Differential DAS areas did not system-
atically vary from vessels that did not use these areas (Figures 3.17 and 3.18). The signs
and signiﬁcance of the Framework42, Differential DAS, and interaction variables were not
robust in the OLS model. The quantile regression results suggests that is due to fairly sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the effect of these variables. After implementation of Framework
42, the prices in the lower quantiles were unchanged or slightly lower; however, prices at
the middle and higher quantiles increased substantially, by �80-150 (Figure 3.19). How-
ever, there is an additional effect due the interaction of the Framework 42 and Differential
DAS variables. Table 3.8 further examines the effects of Framework 42 when the buyer,
seller, both, or neither use the Differential DAS areas. In general, prices after Framework
42 remained constant if the buyer exclusively used the Differential DAS areas. If the buyer
did not use those areas, prices were sustantially higher.
The yearly price effects estimated by quantile regression are similar to the effects esti-
mated by OLS. Relative to 2004, all prices were higher in 2006. However, prices in 2007
and 2008 were only higher in the middle quantiles of the price distribution (Figure 3.23).
Higher prices in 2006 could reﬂect some of the regulatory uncertainty regarding the Emer-
gency Action and the timing of the adoption of Framework 42. The large coefﬁcient on the
2006 dummy variable reﬂects higher prices during the time in the ﬁshery operated under
the 1.4-to-1 DAS counting mandated by the Emergency Action. Also consistent with the
OLS results, trades that occur later in the year occur at lower prices (Figure 3.22). Con-
sistent with the interpretation of DAS as options; the value of a DAS decays at the rate of
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approximately �0.50 per day across most of the price quantiles.
It is also possible to examine bargaining power at individual quantiles. Table 3.9 con-
tains the sums of buyer and seller demographic coefﬁcients (bs + bb) and t−statistics for
demographic characteristics at 5 selected quantiles. A positive combination indicates that
increases in the independent variable lead to higher price. This may be evidence that the
independant variable confers bargaining power to sellers. Conversely, a negative combina-
tion indicates that increases in the dependent variable leads to lower prices. This may be
evidence that the independent variable confers bargaining power to buyers.
In general, there is substantial heterogeneity in the net effect of buyer and seller char-
acteristics across quantiles. Sums of coefﬁcients are generally insigniﬁcant at the τ = 0.10
quantile. These results strongly reject the hypothesis that length confers bargaining power
equally to buyers and sellers at the 50th percentile and higher; length lowers the bargaining
power of buyers relative to sellers. This effect seems to be slightly larger at the higher price
quantiles. The bargaining effects of power are not robust across quantiles. There is also
very weak evidence that higher groundﬁsh revenues confer bargaining power to sellers in
the middle price quantiles. The two measures of opportunity costs of using DAS are also
non-robust across quantiles. Permits have a fairly large positive effect on seller’s bargain-
ing power, but this only occurs at the 25th percentile of price. At this price level, alternative
revenue have a small negative effect on seller bargaining power; while at the 50th percentile
alternative revenue has a small positive effect on seller bargaining power.
Trawl usage may confer bargaining power to buyers at the middle quantiles of price.
However, this ﬁnding is also consistent with higher costs and therefore lower willingness-
to-pay for buyers that use trawl gear. Usage of the Differential DAS areas has a fairly large
negative effect on seller bargaining power at the higher price quantiles, although this effect
reverses itself and disappears at the lower price levels. Again, these ﬁndings are consistent
with lower productivity of DAS under the Differential DAS managment regime and may
not be directly indicative of changes in bargaining power.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter expands on the Harding et al.’s (2003) model in two ways. First, by ex-
amining a good without unobserved characteristics, the assumption of bargaining power
equality used for identiﬁcation can be econometrically tested. Based on analysis using
least squares, the hypothesis of bargaining power equality can be rejected for some de-
mographic characteristics, most notably vessel length. Secondly, this research applies an
alternative econometric technique, quantile regression, to examine the effects of bargaining
power. This method allows for the effects of demographic characteristics on price to vary
across the price distribution.
The major ﬁnding of this research is the trading restrictions based on size and power led
to unequal bargaining power for buyers and sellers. This ﬁnding can resolve an apparent
inconsistency in this market; DAS trade at positive prices even though, in aggregate, there
is excess supply of DAS (as measured by unused DAS). The size and power trading re-
strictions appear to have segmented the DAS market so that there is only excess supply for
smaller, less powerful vessels. A well-designed market for an input permit can efﬁciently
allocate those permits to the most efﬁcient ﬁrms. In this market, limitations on trade have
conferred market power to certain types of individuals.
The productivity of DAS (revenues) do not affect the bargaining power to either buyers
or sellers. This surprising ﬁnding may occur because the restrictive size and power regula-
tions dominate bargaining power changes of revenues. Alternatively, the revenue variable
used may be a poor measure of ﬁrm-level proﬁtability. The share (or lay) system of labor
compensation is used in this ﬁshery; crew are typically paid a fraction of total revenues
minus variable costs and the owner of the ﬁshing vessel receives a share of total revenues.
Therefore, the returns to the owner from using a DAS should be reasonably correlated to
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revenues although heterogeneity in the shares system may limit the ability of revenue to
control for ﬁrm-level proﬁtability.
The negative relationship between price and Time Remaining is likely related to decay
in the time-value of the option. However, alternative interpretations are possible, although
less likely. Sellers could lose bargaining power relative to buyers during the year. How-
ever, a reason for decreases in bargaining power is not clear. Furthermore, the timing of
purchases matters because a vessel cannot hold a negative amount of DAS. If a vessel
runs out of DAS, it must stop ﬁshing unless it can acquire DAS. This may explain higher
willingness-to-pay for DAS early in the ﬁshing year.
These results have implications for ﬁsheries management and general design of mar-
kets. Fishery managers were likely concerned with an increase in total catch associated
with transferring DAS from small vessels to larger, more-efﬁcient vessels. The trading
restrictions based on size and power designed to limit expansion of effort appear to have
segmented the market, inﬂating the prices paid by largest buyers relative to vessels of other
sizes and depressing the prices received by smaller vessels. Ensuring the continued opera-
tion of a diverse ﬁshing ﬂeet was a goal of managers; while the strict regulations on trade
may have accomplished that goal, the cost of this regulation is lower bargaining power for
the smaller ﬁshing vessels.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Allocated Used Aggregate Aggregate Value
Year DASa DAS Leased DAS of Leased DAS
2004 44,030 30,060 6,192 � 2,590,182
2005 51,112 32,194 8,068 � 2,709,263
2006 48,175 32,399 11,245 � 3,279,149
2007 47,802 33,264 13,900 � 4,815,603
2008 47,021 31,701 13,996 � 4,494,270
a:Includes DAS carried over from previous ﬁshing year.
Table 3.1: Historical Days-at-Sea Allocations, Usage, and Leases. Extracted from NMFS
DAS and DAS2 databases.
Length Potential Buyers Potential Sellers
30 feet 924 132
40 feet 810 540
53 feet 517 816
70 feet 318 1,069
80 feet 209 1,204
100 feet 33 1,263
Table 3.2: Number of feasible trading partners by length.
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Figure 3.1: Median and Interquartile range of real DAS prices, Monthly DAS volume
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Figure 3.2: The Differential DAS areas were implemented with Framework Adjustment 42
on Nov 22, 2006.
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Figure 3.4: Weekly DAS Usage.
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Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Length Buyer 9.219*** 8.723*** 7.610***
(1.25) (1.08) (0.93)
Length Seller 0.444 1.363 1.420
(1.36) (1.02) (0.89)
Power Buyer -9.500 -1.511 3.417
(5.84) (4.78) (3.70)
Power Seller 5.539 -0.0972 0.509
(4.67) (2.78) (2.50)
DAS Buyer 1.017 -2.880 -0.0648
(5.07) (3.70) (3.06)
DAS Seller 6.733 8.866 5.269
(6.23) (6.43) (5.49)
Alternative Buyer 2.880 1.786 1.866
(3.21) (2.59) (2.01)
Alternative Seller 8.039*** 7.437*** 7.934***
(1.96) (1.92) (1.68)
Permits Buyer 25.41* 0.536 -4.091
(14.0) (7.06) (4.41)
Permits Seller 7.077 14.79*** 26.94***
(6.97) (4.83) (4.06)
Experience Buyer 0.619 -3.545* -3.059*
(3.58) (2.05) (1.67)
Experience Seller -4.417 -4.598 -3.275
(5.66) (2.92) (2.53)
Trawl Buyer 13.41 -53.25*** -68.06***
(33.6) (14.4) (10.5)
Trawl Seller -87.11* -3.723 -18.06*
(44.6) (14.2) (10.7)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Coefﬁcients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. Model 1 uses the full sample,
Model 2 omits observations for which price is higher than �3,000, and Model 3 omits ob-
servations for which price is higher than �1,500. Trimming of the sample leads to moderate
changes in estimated coefﬁcients. Dummy variables for Year are based on the ﬁshing year
for groundﬁsh, which runs from May-April. Part 1 of 2.
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Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time Remaining 0.360** 0.592*** 0.528***
(0.15) (0.086) (0.065)
Framework42 12.79 102.4** 84.64**
(61.9) (46.2) (37.4)
Differential Buyer 84.15 7.735 17.88
(54.0) (27.2) (23.9)
Differential Seller -8.835 3.540 1.376
(37.2) (27.3) (24.4)
F42 x Differential Buyer -92.97 -60.41* -85.12***
(67.7) (34.5) (26.8)
F42 x Differential Seller 70.71 -18.72 -25.91
(73.6) (30.6) (25.1)
D2005 -17.82 2.351 -34.15
(30.2) (27.2) (20.9)
D2006 206.7*** 156.5*** 140.8***
(47.0) (30.7) (26.5)
D2007 128.7* 33.01 39.24
(66.8) (45.7) (37.5)
D2008 182.0*** 74.25 72.60*
(68.8) (49.1) (39.7)
Constant -436.1*** -439.6*** -405.9***
(61.2) (53.5) (48.5)
Observations 1788 1781 1756
R2 0.21 0.38 0.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Coefﬁcients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. Model 1 uses the full sample,
Model 2 omits observations for which price is higher than �3,000, and Model 3 omits
observations for which price is higher than �1,500. Part 2 of 2.
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Figure 3.5: Residuals vs. Fitted values, Model 1. While most residuals are fairly small,
there are a good number observations for which predicted prices were low but actual prices
were high.
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(1) (2) (3)
Length 9.66 10.10 9.03
(9.09) (11.58) (14.53)
Power -3.96 -1.61 3.93
(-0.72) (-0.37) (1.21)
DAS 7.75 5.99 5.20
(0.94) (0.80) (0.83)
Alternative 10.90 9.22 9.80
(2.66) (2.62) (3.89)
Permits 32.50 15.30 22.90
(2.43) (2.03) (4.29)
Experience -3.80 -8.14 -6.33
(-0.66) (-2.39) (-2.13)
Trawl -73.70 -57.00 -86.10
(-2.75) (-3.00) (-6.00)
Differential 75.30 11.30 19.26
(1.65) (0.33) (0.69)
F42xDifferential -22.30 -79.10 -111.00
(-0.25) (-1.96) (-3.47)
Figure 3.6: Sums of buyer and seller demographic coefﬁcients with t− ratios for H0: b
b +
bs = 0 in parentheses.
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Coefﬁcient 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Length Buyer 0.667
� 0�674)
5.199
� 0�941)
7.922
� 0�799)
9.649
� 0�923)
10.050
� 1�400)
Length Seller − 0.186
� 0�421)
− 2.150
� 0�700)
2.103
� 0�863)
2.815
� 0�870)
4.390
� 1�366)
Power Buyer 0.130
� 1�315)
− 0.777
� 2�608)
4.867
� 2�978)
5.728
� 2�912)
0.585
� 4�104)
Power Seller − 0.417
� 1�075)
− 1.109
� 1�637)
0.181
� 2�273)
2.067
� 2�425)
4.779
� 3�999)
DAS Buyer − 1.592
� 2�275)
− 4.240
� 2�987)
6.007
� 2�902)
1.657
� 2�927)
− 1.052
� 4�248)
DAS Seller − 1.528
� 4�461)
8.208
� 6�085)
7.314
� 2�598)
12.151
� 4�154)
10.087
� 4�884)
Alternative Buyer 0.367
� 1�040)
0.172
� 2�284)
1.584
� 1�987)
1.323
� 2�173)
− 0.869
� 2�451)
Alternative Seller 5.245
� 5�438)
15.179
� 2�641)
8.551
� 1�865)
4.545
� 1�315)
1.050
� 2�071)
Permits Buyer − 0.125
� 1�557)
− 2.373
� 3�662)
− 13.068
� 4�180)
− 2.528
� 5�004)
9.833
� 8�198)
Permits Seller 9.263
� 7�579)
41.311
� 4�647)
15.096
� 3�710)
3.518
� 3�791)
− 9.053
� 5�919)
Experience Buyer − 0.556
� 0�736)
− 2.065
� 1�277)
− 3.002
� 1�372)
− 1.014
� 1�535)
− 3.123
� 1�684)
Experience Seller − 0.752
� 1�013)
− 3.645
� 1�861)
− 0.311
� 1�899)
− 1.630
� 2�325)
0.375
� 3�025)
Trawl Buyer − 8.604
� 9�579)
− 52.179
� 11�213)
− 52.038
� 11�086)
− 43.986
� 12�307)
− 1.131
� 18�000)
Trawl Seller 3.249
� 5�789)
9.677
� 13�039)
− 32.638
� 12�176)
− 7.800
� 10�301)
6.117
� 14�074)
Table 3.6: Quantile Regression coefﬁcients for selected quantiles. Standard errors in paren-
theses, generated using 20,000 bootstrap replications. Part 1 of 2.
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Covariates 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Differential Buyer 0.397
� 9�725)
1.594
� 25�413)
17.511
� 22�884)
− 3.032
� 22�834)
39.947
� 32�264)
Differential Seller − 17.131
� 33�098)
14.084
� 32�045)
5.103
� 21�190)
24.513
� 21�992)
16.597
� 29�168)
F42xDifferential Buyer 12.593
� 13�019)
− 8.434
� 28�892)
−126.417
� 26�750)
−112.816
� 27�407)
−135.419
� 40�827)
F42xDifferential Seller 5.948
� 33�090)
− 37.435
� 31�792)
13.272
� 26�175)
− 27.688
� 24�822)
− 25.748
� 36�810)
Framework42 − 7.724
� 11�626)
− 14.435
� 48�910)
80.510
� 37�454)
155.838
� 39�940)
156.209
� 46�290)
Time Remaining − 0.001
� 0�024)
0.265
� 0�077)
0.460
� 0�062)
0.421
� 0�056)
0.485
� 0�083)
D2005 − 4.280
� 9�205)
− 28.047
� 18�378)
− 15.203
� 21�566)
− 15.065
� 18�928)
− 5.681
� 26�049)
D2006 0.989
� 8�075)
73.089
� 43�789)
162.121
� 24�739)
190.622
� 25�992)
235.257
� 41�658)
D2007 4.093
� 12�236)
92.762
� 46�744)
102.670
� 38�664)
10.803
� 40�789)
13.752
� 51�254)
D2008 10.460
� 15�353)
102.200
� 47�997)
117.070
� 39�598)
30.039
� 41�915)
35.930
� 53�385)
Constant − 12.181
� 19�915)
−129.895
� 54�597)
−451.113
� 48�248)
−511.274
� 38�782)
−567.143
� 50�622)
R1 0.02 0.17 0.41 0.51 0.47
Table 3.7: Quantile Regression coefﬁcients for selected quantiles. Standard errors in paren-
theses, generated using 20,000 bootstrap replications. Part 2 of 2.
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Figure 3.7: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Length.
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Figure 3.8: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Length.
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Figure 3.9: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Power.
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Figure 3.10: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Power.
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Figure 3.11: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer DAS Revenue.
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Figure 3.12: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller DAS Revenue.
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Figure 3.13: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Alternative Revenue.
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Figure 3.14: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Permits.
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Figure 3.15: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Alternative Revenue.
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Figure 3.16: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Permits.
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Figure 3.17: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Differential DAS.
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Figure 3.18: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Differential DAS.
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Figure 3.19: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients -Framework 42.
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Figure 3.20: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer F42xDifferential DAS.
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Figure 3.21: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller F42xDifferential DAS.
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Figure 3.22: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Time Remaining in Fishing Year.
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(a) D2005
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(b) D2006
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(c) D2007
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(d) D2008
Figure 3.23: Dummy Variables for 2005-2008 Fishing Years.
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Differential Seller=1 Differential Seller=0
Differential Buyer=1 -60.3 -22.87
(-1.40) (-0.49)
Differential Buyer=0 -51.87 -14.43
(-1.04) (-0.30)
(a) 25th Quantile
Differential Seller=1 Differential Seller=0
Differential Buyer=1 -32.64 -45.91
(-0.88) (-1.26)
Differential Buyer=0 93.78 80.51
(2.21) (2.15)
(b) 50th Quantile
Differential Seller=1 Differential Seller=0
Differential Buyer=1 15.33 43.02
(0.38) (1.06)
Differential Buyer=0 128.15 155.84
(2.87) (3.91)
(c) 75th Quantile
Differential Seller=1 Differential Seller=0
Differential Buyer=1 -4.96 20.79
(-0.09) (0.37)
Differential Buyer=0 130.46 156.21
(2.31) (3.39)
(d) 90th Quantile
Table 3.8: Partial Effect of Framework 42’s Differential Days-at-Sea, for combinations of
Differential Days-at-Sea users (t-statistics in parentheses).
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0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Length 0.48 3.05 10.03 12.46 14.44
(1.12) (3.85) (13.05) (19.31) (14.14)
Power -0.29 -1.89 5.05 7.80 5.36
(-0.22) (-0.74) (1.89) (3.22) (1.68)
DAS -3.12 3.97 13.32 13.81 9.04
(-0.62) (0.66) (3.57) (2.69) (1.40)
Alternative 5.61 15.35 10.14 5.87 0.18
(1.08) (4.33) (3.73) (2.35) (0.06)
Differential -16.73 15.68 22.61 21.48 56.54
(0.53) (0.44) (0.86) (0.78) (1.46)
Experience -1.31 -5.71 -3.31 -2.64 -2.75
(-1.08) (-2.43) (-1.50) (-0.98) (-0.91)
Trawl -5.35 -42.50 -84.68 -51.79 4.99
(-0.59) (-2.60) (-5.45) (-3.64) (0.24)
Permits 9.14 38.94 2.03 0.99 0.78
(1.22) (6.73) (0.38) (0.18) (0.08)
F42xDifferential 18.54 45.87 -113.15 -140.50 -161.17
(0.60) (-1.20) (-3.41) (-4.60) (-3.46)
Table 3.9: Sums of buyer and seller demographic coefﬁcients with t− ratios for H0: b
b +
bs = 0 in parentheses.
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Chapter 4
Economic Tradeoffs in the Gulf of Maine
Ecosystem: Herring and Watching
4.1 Introduction
In contrast to traditional ﬁsheries management which has historically focused on the extrac-
tive ﬁshing industry, Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) prioritizes overall
ecosystem health and attempts to consider all users of ecosystem resources in the decision-
making calculus (Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004). This research examines the effect
of a recent change in ﬁsheries policy, a seasonal ban on trawling for herring in the in-
shore Gulf of Maine, on the commercial whale-watching industry. Drawing upon Crocker
and Tschirhart’s (1992) ecosystem-externality model and Sanchirico and Wilen’s (1999)
spatially-explicit ﬁshery model, this research examines the theory of localized depletion as
it affects the commercial whale-watching industry.
This theory claims that intense trawling for herring causes temporary reductions the
their abundance, depressing the abundances of whales and other highly mobile predators
of herring (Schreiber, 2005; Moser, 2007; Herring Alliance, 2008). If true, this is likely
to lead to increased search times by whale-watching vessels. Extensive search by whale-
watching vessels is costly for ﬁrms and is also likely to reduce consumer welfare. Time
spent viewing whales is a “good” while time spent searching is likely to be a “bad.” While
an extensive consumer valuation literature exists for whales (Hoagland and Meeks, 2000;
Loomis et al., 2000; Shaikh and Larson, 2003), this research examines the value of leaving
a stock of ﬁsh in the ecosystem.
This research is the inverse of Flaaten and Stollery’s (1996) model, which examined
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the costs imposed by predatory whales on a ﬁshery. It also related to a large bioeconomic
literature which seeks to understand economically efﬁcient harvest levels in a predator-prey
system (Hannesson, 1983; Stro¨bele and Wacker, 1995; Brown et al., 2005; Hoekstra and
van den Bergh, 2005). In this ecosystem, the spatial location of predators and prey is of
vital importance: whale-watching ﬁrms depend on a high abundance of whales that are
close to shore.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 The Whale­watching Industry
Whale-watching is a �30M industry (revenue/year) in New England with approximately
one million commercial passengers and is growing at roughly 10% per year (Hoyt, 2001).
In addition, consumer surplus from commercial trips has been estimated at roughly �29
per trip in the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary (Hoagland and Meeks, 2000).
However, no research exists that examines the cost (or value) of the search process from a
consumer point of view. While consumers may view search as a “good”, a “bad”, or both,
ﬁrms undoubtedly view increases in search time as an additional cost. The whale-watching
season runs from late spring through early fall, overlapping with a large portion of the
herring ﬁshing season.
Fin, humpback, and minke whales are most commonly sighted on whale-watching trips.
These animals are thought to have fairly strong site ﬁdelity at both large and small scales;
they consistently use the Gulf of Maine to feed on herring, sand lance, and other small
ﬁsh (Overholtz et al., 2000; Read and Brownstein, 2003; Robbins, 2007). Despite this site
ﬁdelity, whales are known to be responsive to changes in prey availability (Weinrich et al.,
1997, 2005).
The commercial whale-watching vessels are based in many ports in the Gulf of Maine,
ranging from Provincetown, Massachusetts to Bar Harbor, Maine (Figure 4.1). Fixed costs
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(physical capital, insurance, wharfage, and crew labor) are high relative to variable costs
(fuel). Higher fuel costs due to increased search time are likely to be the largest short-run
impact of localized depletion. Most whale-watching companies have a home searching area
that is limited by the speed of their vessel and their proximity to oceanographic features
with which whales are commonly associated. A whale-watching trip is advertised to last
between 3 to 4 hours; however, a large portion that time is spent in search and travel.
Vessels depart from port and travel towards a whale-watching area. While whales can
be seen at any time, they are typically found close to the large oceanographic features,
where prey aggregate in large numbers. Because the whale-watching industry is limited
to a relatively small part of the Gulf of Maine, decreased abundance of whales in this area
could impact this industry even if whale populations remain stable across the entire Gulf of
Maine.
In this chapter, the determinants of search time of ﬁve of the seven whale-watching
companies located between Gloucester, MA and Rye, NH are examined. The whale-
watching companies analyzed in this study overlap spatially with the southernmost portion
of the herring ﬁshing grounds. These vessels typically travel to the two large oceanographic
features located in this area: the shallow, sandy-bottomed Stellwagen Bank and the some-
what deeper, rocky-bottomed Jeffrey’s Ledge. In this region, herring ﬁshing occurs fairly
often on Jeffrey’s Ledge and very infrequently on Stellwagen Bank.
4.2.2 The Herring Fishery
In the Gulf of Maine, herring are prey for many species of marine life (Overholtz et al.,
2000; Read and Brownstein, 2003; Chase, 2002) and are also target of a �9-20M ﬁshery
(NMFS, pers. comm.) The ﬁshery is primarily pursued with purse seine and mid-water
trawl gear. The herring ﬁshery is a limited-access ﬁshery that is divided into four zones
and managed with a zonal Total Allowable Catch (TAC). The aggregate TAC for herring
are based on a set of reference points that are designed to ensure that ﬁshing occurs at Op-
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timal Yield (OY), which is set at Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) less an allowance for
uncertainty and socioeconomic considerations. The herring stock is currently classiﬁed as
underutilized; the industry does not catch the entire aggregate TAC. However, this classiﬁ-
cation is based on traditional single-species management, which does not consider use by
non-human consumers such as whales or predatory ﬁsh, or the impacts of herring ﬁshing on
whale-watching. Fishing in the inshore Gulf of Maine (Zone 1A) is most active during the
summer months, spatially and temporally overlapping the whale-watching industry (Figure
4.2).
In addition to a zonal TAC, the inshore ﬁshery is subject to seasonal closures to protect
spawning herring. This closure is designed to ensure reproductive success of spawning
ﬁsh. When spawning, herring aggregate into large numbers in the shallow, nearshore areas.
In the southern Gulf of Maine, this closure occurs from mid-September to mid-October.
4.3 Modeling Approach
Localized depletion is thought to be a fundamentally short-term and spatially dependent;
the effects of this phenomenonon are modeled as an ecosystem externality in the spirit
of Crocker and Tschirhart (1992). In this model, there is a (known) relationship between
predator and prey in the ecosystem. The actions of one group of users (ﬁshers) will affect
the welfare of the other group of users (whale-watchers) through the ecosystem processes
that govern the two species. The localized depletion hypothesis requires two processes to
occur: a biological depletion effect on herring and a migration response by whales. As
Crocker and Tschirhart (1992) note, the exact relationships between the predator and prey
are often unknown; however, the impact on human activities is of primary concern, not the
exact workings of the biological system.
Furthermore, the localized depletion hypothesis is concerned with the ﬁne-scale spatial
characteristics of the system. Because whale-watching vessels are conﬁned to the nearshore
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area by speed and time constraints, whales located in the offshore areas cannot be utilized
by whale-watching ﬁrms. Sanchirico and Wilen’s (1999) spatial bioeconomic model pro-
vides a useful framework in which to understand the spatial considerations of the herring-,
whale-, and whale-watching interactions.
The search behavior of whale-watching vessels is assumed to be simple. Whale-watching
vessels leave port in search of whales, traveling at high speeds towards the areas where
whales are likely to be seen. Vessels stop traveling when a whale is sighted and view
the whale(s) for an extended period of time. When this occurs, a trip is considered to be
completed and successful. Not all whale-watching trips are successful; after an extended
period of unsuccessful search, whale-watching vessels may return to port without sighting
a whale.
We assume that whale-watching ﬁrms minimize expected search time conditional on
the availability of whales in the searchable area of the ecosystem.
min SearchT imeit�WhalesNt) (4.1)
s.t.WhalesNt = f�HerringNt)
Subscripts i, t, and N refer to individuals, time periods, and nearshore whale-watching
zones respectively. While the actual search time is observable; the choice variables, such
as search direction, speed, or labor devoted to searching, are unobservable. However, the
SearchT ime function is decreasing in whale availability; the existence of large numbers
of whales in the nearshore area leads to low search times for whale-watching vessels. The
localized depletion hypothesis maintains that the availability of whales in the nearshore
area is an increasing function of herring in the search area. Whales may move from areas
of low prey availability to areas of high prey availability.
The actions of the ﬁshing industry are not modeled in this research; however, it is
useful to consider the industry’s objectives. We assume that vessels in this industry are
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proﬁt-maximizing entities, choosing both when and where to ﬁsh based on proﬁtability.
The assumptions that ﬁshers prefer times and areas that have high expected revenues and
low expected costs are at the common to the recent economic efforts to model the spa-
tial behavior of ﬁshing vessels (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Holland and Sutinen, 2000;
Hicks and Schnier, 2008). The catch data generally supports these ideas; catch in the in-
shore zone is high relative to catch in the offshore regions 1. All things being equal, ﬁshing
in the inshore area is preferable due to both lower costs of access and faster round trip
steaming times. Indirectly, location and amounts of ﬁshing can provide some insight into
the availability of herring: ﬁshing activity may be an indicator of high herring availability.
When unregulated, ﬁshing vessels prefer to ﬁsh in the inshore area and will not take into
account the depletive effects of their ﬁshing on the whale-watching industry. This is the
(potential) source of the ecosystem externality; and the quantifying this effect is necessary
to successfully implement Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management.
4.4 Data and Econometric Model
In this analysis, three sources of data are used: ﬁve whale-watching organizations in the
southern part of the Gulf of Maine provided trip-level data, ﬁshing effort and catch data
were extracted from the NMFS Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and Vessel Trip Report
(VTR) datasets, and oceanographic data were obtained from the Gulf of Maine Oceano-
graphic Observation System (GoMOOS).
The dependent variable in this study is amount of time, in minutes, that a whale-
watching vessel spends searching for a whale (Search Time). It is constructed from whale-
watching trip reports that are maintained by whale-watching companies and their afﬁliated
research groups2. These data span the 2002-2006 whale-watching seasons for Gloucester
1http://www�nefmc�org/herring/safe_reports/herringsafe�html
2While whale-watching companies typically undertake multiple trips per day, only the ﬁrst trip of the day
is used in this analysis. The reliability of the dependent variable for subsequent trips is poor.
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based vessels and the 2003-2006 seasons for New Hampshire and northern Massachusetts
based vessels. During this period, none of the vessels made capital improvements that
would substantially affect their speed or ability to ﬁnd whales.
The localized depletion theory claims that ﬁshing will be detrimental to subsequent
whale-watching outcomes, but is vague about the appropriate spatial and temporal scales.
A two-step process is used to categorize ﬁshing that occurs in the nearshore whale-watching
areas. First, the whale-watching areas are deﬁned by using depth contours of the oceano-
graphic features in the region: Stellwagen Bank and Jeffrey’s Ledge. The edge that is
farthest from the coast is assumed to be the boundary beyond which whale-watching ves-
sels do not search. Areas of the ocean closer to whale-watching ports are deﬁned as the
whale-watching areas.
The second step in this process is to isolate ﬁshing catch and effort that is located
within these the areas that whale-watching vessels use. The variables Catch and Effort
are constructed using the Vessel Trip Report (VTR) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)
datasets. The VTR dataset is composed of self-reported logbooks that include trip dates,
locations, and catch amounts. The VTR data are used directly to construct a measure of
herring catch. The reported locations of herring catch are plotted and observations that
lie within the two deﬁned whale-watching areas are extracted. The total catch is then
aggregated at the daily level to form one version of the Catch variable 3.
An alternate measure of ﬁshing activity is constructed using the Vessel Monitoring Sys-
tem (VMS). This system reports detailed positions of ﬁshing vessels at frequent intervals
(30 minutes to 1 hour) and is required for all major vessels in the herring ﬁshery. Palmer
and Wigley (2007) developed an algorithm to use the VMS system to locate ﬁshing effort
at a ﬁne spatial-scale;this technique relies on correlating vessel speeds with activities. Very
slow speeds correspond to ﬁshing and related activities while high speeds correspond to
traveling. The points corresponding to ﬁshing activity are plotted and observations lying
3100 metric tons of herring corresponds to a large catch of ﬁsh by a single vessel.
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within the two whale-watching areas are extracted. The number of the unique vessels is
used to construct an alternative measure of the Effort variable. While VMS can be used
for very ﬁne scale location and time observations of ﬁshing effort, the actual catch is not
recorded along with the locations.
The variablesDepletion Catch andDepletion Effort are constructed using a 7-day mov-
ing sum of the Catch and Effort respectively 4. In this dataset, purse seine ﬁshing makes
up only a small fraction of the overall ﬁshing activity; no distinction is made between the
two in this analysis. In addition to the Catch, Effort, and the Depletion variables, a ﬁnal
indicator of herring availability is used. Because the inshore Gulf of Maine herring ﬁshery
is subject to a seasonal spawning closure, a dummy variable, Spawning, is included in the
model to account for high abundances of herring during these periods.
Weather and oceanographic conditions are likely to affect the ability of vessels to ﬁnd
whales. In order to control for this, two oceanographic measures, Visibility andWind Speed,
were extracted from GoMOOS. Poor visibility may be caused by haze, rain or fog and di-
rectly affects the ability of a whale-watching boat to ﬁnd whales. Low visibility is expected
to increase search time. Additionally, high winds can cause whitecaps to form on the sur-
face of the ocean, introducing visual clutter and decreasing the ability of vessels to ﬁnd
whales. Therefore, high wind speeds might be expected to increase search times. Unfortu-
nately, data that would control directly for changes in herring or whale abundances is not
available at the ﬁne scale and precision necessary for this analysis. Estimates are unavail-
able for herring stock levels for 2006 (Transboundary Resource Assessment Committee,
2006). Similarly, stock assessments for whales are not performed yearly and estimates
are fairly imprecise (Waring et al., 1997). Figure 4.3 maps the locations of home ports of
whale-watching vessels studied, the locations of GoMOOS data buoys, and a representa-
tion of the Stellwagen Bank and Jeffrey’s Ledge whale-watching areas. Table 4.1 contains
summary statistics for the variables used.
4The bandwidth used to construct the moving sum is varied in order to verify robustness of the results.
Results are robust to moderate changes in the construction of this variable.
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The two ﬁxed-effects model estimated are:
SearchT imeit =β1Depletion Catchit + β2Catchit + β3WindSpeedit
+ β4V isibilityit + β5Spawningit + αZui + eit� (4.2)
and
SearchT imeit =β1Depletion Effortit + β2Effortit + β3WindSpeedit
+ β4V isibilityit + β5Spawningit + αZ + ui + eit� (4.3)
where i indexes vessels, t indexes days, Z is a vector of yearly dummy variables, and
ui and eit are individual speciﬁc and idiosyncratic errors respectively. Standard errors
are calculated that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
(Schaffer, 2007).
Although whale-watching ﬁrms guarantee that at least one whale will be sighted, ap-
proximately 7.2% of trips in this dataset did not successfully ﬁnd a whale. When estimating
the ﬁxed-effects model, the trips that did not encounter whales were dropped from estima-
tion. This potentially creates a sample-selection problem, the coefﬁcients estimated in
equation (4.2) and (4.3) are the effects of the independent variables on search time, condi-
tional on a trip being successful. However, the same factors that affect search time may also
cause a trip to be unsuccessful. The linear model in equation (4.2) and (4.3) cannot account
for this sample censoring effect. Therefore, two right-censored Tobit model is estimated:
SearchT ime∗it =γ1Depletion Catchit + γ2Catchit + γ3WindSpeedit
+ γ4V isibilityit + γ5Spawningit + αZ + ui + eit� (4.4)
SearchT imeit =min�SearchT ime
∗
it� SearchT ime}�
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and
SearchT ime∗it =γ1Depletion Effortit + γ2Effortit + γ3WindSpeedit
+ γ4V isibilityit + γ5Spawningit + αZ + ui + eit� (4.5)
SearchT imeit =min�SearchT ime
∗
it� SearchT ime}�
where SearchT ime is the upper limit of the search time and is set at the highest ob-
served search time. While the coefﬁcients estimated with a ﬁxed-effects Tobit model are
known to be biased, the magnitude of this bias is small and decreases quickly as T increases
(Greene, 2004).
For both sets of models, a positive coefﬁcient for the Depletion variable is consistent
with the model of localized depletion. The localized depletion model does not generate any
hypotheses about Fishing. However, economic intuition suggests it may be a proxy for high
abundances of herring since proﬁt maximizing ﬁshermen are likely to ﬁsh only in areas of
high abundances of ﬁsh. A negative coefﬁcient for the Spawning dummy variable would
also be consistent with “localized aggregation” and provide indirect supporting evidence
that whales are sensitive to prey abundances.
4.5 Results and Discussion
The search times of whale watching ﬁrms are highly variable and there are only a small
number of explanatory variables in this analysis. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
overall ﬁt of the estimated models is fairly low, the pseudo-R2 is approximately 0.13 for
the Tobit model and the R2 is 0.085 for the linear model (Table 2). The two R2 statistics
are not directly comparable; the datasets used to estimate the two classes of models are
slightly different. In general, the signs of the estimated coefﬁcients are consistent across
the two general models (linear ﬁxed-effects and Tobit). The coefﬁcients in the Tobit model
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are larger in magnitude, and in some cases they are much larger. Because the ﬁxed-effects
model ignores trips in which no whales are sighted, the interpretation of these results is
limited to successful trips. To be precise, they are the effects that an independent variable
has on the search time, conditional on that trip ﬁnding a whale to view. For this reason,
discussion of results is focused on the Tobit model; those coefﬁcients can be interpreted as
the effect of an independent variable on the search time of all trips.
In general, the results provide moderate support for the theory of localized depletion;
this effect is largest in the Tobit models. Using the catch based measure of depletion,
an increase of 100 mt of catch will lead to search time increases of approximately 1.6
minutes. Using the effort based measure, a ﬁshing trip is found toincrease search times by
approximately 0.6 minutes.
The ﬁshing coefﬁcients (Catch and Effort) are negative; however, they are statis-
tically signiﬁcant in only one of the two Tobit model (and neither of the linear models).
This is slightly surprising, although ﬁshing may simply be a poor proxy for local herring
abundances in the nearshore Gulf of Maine. The herring ﬁshing ﬂeet consists of relatively
few vessels and it is possible that the “good” ﬁshing locations simply do not get visited. In
contrast, the spawning coefﬁcient is large in magnitude, negative, and highly signiﬁcant.
During the spawning period in which the herring ﬁshery is closed, whale-watching search
times decrease by approximately 19 minutes, or nearly 25%. It is important to note that
the spawning closure should not be interpreted as the effect of zero ﬁshing effort. During
this time, the availability of herring is likely to be much higher than normal. While the ex-
act increase in the nearshore herring biomass are not known during this time, the increase
in availability of prey ﬁsh seems to be beneﬁcial for the whale-watching industry. Wind
speeds are not informative about search time; however, low visibility is,unsurprisingly, bad
for whale-watchers.
The differences between the Tobit and ﬁxed effects models are most striking for two of
the explanatory variables: Visibility, which is over 3 times larger in the Tobit speciﬁcation
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and the 2004 dummy variable, which is 8 times larger. The statistical mechanism by which
poor visibility works is straightforward: more unsuccessful trips occur during periods of
poor visibility. These trips are not modeled in the ﬁxed-effects estimation, but are included
in the Tobit model. Poor visibility probably impacts whale-watching vessels in two ways:
increasing search times and increasing tor probability of an unsuccessful trip. The large
difference in the 2004 coefﬁcient is due to the the same statistical reasons; 16% of all trips
failed to see whales in 2004, compared to 5% of trips in all other years. However, it is
difﬁcult to explain the exact reason why 2004 was a comparatively unsuccessful season.
The yearly dummy variables are included to control for large scale oceanographic pro-
cesses and are highly signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude across speciﬁcations. The 2002
dummy variable was dropped from the estimation; the coefﬁcients may be interpreted as
an average change in search time relative to search time in 2002. Between 2002-2005,
the spawning stock biomass of herring has been roughly constant5, ﬂuctuating between
1.04-1.12 million metric tons (Transboundary Resource Assessment Committee, 2006).
While historical population growth rates for humpback whales were estimated at 6.5%
(Barlow and Clapham, 1997), estimates of whale populations are subject to large amounts
of uncertainty. Recent stock assessments for the two most commonly sighted species show
ﬂuctuations within the range of uncertainty (Waring et al., 1997).
The estimation results from this model can be used to evaluate the effect of the recently
enacted trawling-ban. After lobbying by whale-watching, recreational, and hook-and-line
ﬁshing interests, NEFMC closed the inshore region (Zone 1A) to trawling during the sum-
mer months (June-September). These groups claimed that trawling leads to localized de-
pletion of herring, reducing the abundance of whales and larger ﬁsh. The summer Zone 1A
ﬁshery remains open to purse seine gear. Fishing effort and catch were aggregated into a
single localized depletion variable due to the extremely low occurrence of purse seining in
the dataset. Of the 2,480 observed whale-watching trips, 670 trips experienced increased
52006 stock assessments are not yet available
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search times due to localized depletion. Elimination of ﬁshing would reduce search of
those 670 trips by an average of 6 minutes. Whale-watching vessels use between 60-100
gallons of fuel per hour (McInnis, pers. comm.), which translates to an additional �13 in
costs per-affected-trip 6.
This inshore ﬁshery closure is costly for ﬁshermen. If they wish to continue ﬁshing for
herring, they may convert from trawl to purse seine gear or they may ﬁsh exclusively in the
offshore regions during the closure. Conversion is believed to cost approximately �300,000
while ﬁshing in offshore zones is increase variable costs (primarily fuel) by �3,000-6,000
per trip (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2007). The effects of this
closure may also propagate through the regional economy. Lobster ﬁshermen in Maine use
herring as bait in their traps; it is unclear whether a partial closure will disrupt that market
(U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2007).
It is important to note the limitations of this data and therefore the limitations of this
study. Fine-scale spatial data on the availabilities of whales and their prey is unavailable.
Additional, it is not possible to model the information sets of the whale-watching vessels.
Anecdotally, whale-watching captains share information, particularly during times of low
whale availability. This mechanism is likely to mitigate the effect of localized depletion.
This is a speciﬁc example of “averting behavior”: the ability of rational optimizing agents
to change their actions to avoid economic losses. Because this is not modeled, the effects of
reduced prey availability on the search times of whale-watching ﬁrms are underestimated
in the statistical model. In addition to sharing information, whale-watching ﬁrms may alter
their search locations and patters or simply cancel trips when searching is expected to be
difﬁcult. Only a sub-sample of the whale-watching industry in the Gulf of Maine was
examined in this research. Other ﬁrms may be affected more or less by ﬁshing activity.
In addition, the assumption that ﬁrms are minimizing search times is likely to be slightly
6Mean diesel price from April 1, 2002 to October 30, 2006, as calculated from the US Department of
Energy’s Energy Information Administration’s website. http://tonto�eia�doe�gov/dnav/pet/
pet_pri_spt_s1_d�htm
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inaccurate; while search time minimization would be consistent with short-run proﬁt max-
imization, whale-watching ﬁrms are maximizing long-run proﬁts. This would include
accounting for the ability of current whale-watching outcomes to affect future demand
through updating of consumer expectations. Whale-watching trips are likely to be an he-
donic good in which demand is a function of prices and attributes (Rosen, 1974). These
attributes probably include not just search time, but perhaps the number of whales that
are seen on a trip. Firms may have some ability to substitute between these attributes; it
is reasonable to believe that ﬁrms will favor other quality attributes during times of high
whale-availability, but favor low search times during periods of poor availability. If true,
the statistical model again underestimates the localized depletion effect.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Resource economists have a long history of modeling predator-prey interactions in bioeco-
nomic models (Flaaten and Stollery, 1996; Hannesson, 1983; Brown et al., 2005; Ragozin
and Brown, 1985). Recently, non-extractive (“ecosystem”) uses of resources have been
incorporated in these models (Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2005; Boncoeur et al., 2002).
This research examines the short-run interactions between prey, predators, and users of
both of those resources. In the southern Gulf of Maine, herring ﬁshermen are direct and
depletive users of herring while whale-watchers are indirect and non-depletive users of the
resource.
This study examines a small portion of the localized depletion theory: search times of
whale-watching vessels. There are certainly other ways that ﬁshing could affect whale-
watching, including reducing the number of whales sighted by vessels or altering the ac-
tivities of whales seen. In the long-run, this may affect the consumer’s demand for whale-
watching trips. This research ﬁnds moderate evidence that the herring ﬁshing has an impact
on whale-watching search times through a localized depletion mechanism. However, at
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current stock levels of both herring and whales, the estimated economic impacts are small.
The statistical model ﬁnds strong evidence for a “localized aggregation” effect; when
herring are spawning, search times drastically decrease. During the spawning period, much
of the herring biomass is concentrated in the nearshore area. Relative to periods in which
herring are not spawning, abundances are extremely high during this period, and the de-
crease in search times is most likely attributable to the increase in prey that are available to
whales.
Recent policy decisions to close the nearshore herring ﬁshery were enacted with the aim
of preserving forage levels for predators of herring, such as whales, tunas, and groundﬁsh.
This research ﬁnds a small effect on whale-watching ﬁrms; closure of the nearshore ﬁshery
results in slightly shorter search times and small economic gains for whale-watching ﬁrms
relative to the costs imposed on the ﬁshing industry.
It is important to note that the results in the paper are fundamentally short-term in nature
and do not take into account the long-run dynamics of either the biological or economic
systems. The impacts of herring ﬁshing at different stock levels are difﬁcult to quantify
and may be very different from the effects found in this research. However, because search
times decline so dramatically during the time that herring are spawning in the southern
Gulf of Maine, it seems reasonable to believe that increases of herring stock levels would
be beneﬁcial for the whale-watching industry. Long-run changes to demand for whale-
watching trips may also be important. If “quality” declines due to increased search times,
this may change the demand for whale-watching, leading to either lower prices, fewer
participants, or both. This research has examined only the short-term interactions of herring
ﬁshing and whale-watching; the much more difﬁcult long-run analysis of the consumer side
must be left to future research.
90
4.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 4.1: Location of whale-watching ports,ﬁshing ports, and oceanographic features in
the Gulf of Maine.
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Figure 4.2: Average Weekly landings for inshore Gulf of Maine herring. Shaded portion
indicates whale-watching season.
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable, n=2301
Search Time Minutes 91.2 37.1 12 379
Censored Observations 7.2%
Fishing Measures
Fishing Trips/Day 0.608 1.61 0 12
100s of metric tons/Day .282 1.06 0 11.9
Spawning =1 if ﬁshery closed
due to spawning 9.31%
Oceanographic Variables
Wind Speed Meters/second 3.74 1.88 0 11.2
Visibility Kilometers 2.62 0.656 0.091 2.96
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Search Time, Fishing, and Oceanographic variables.
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Figure 4.3: Study area including data buoys, whale-watching area, and home ports vessels
analyzed.
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Tobit Model Linear Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depletion - Catch 1.640∗∗∗ .556∗∗∗
(.548) (.214)
Depletion - Effort .626∗∗ .210∗
(.279) (.107)
Catch -3.330 .015
(2.200) (.743)
Effort -2.792∗∗ .113
(1.290) (.518)
Wind Speed 1.696∗ 1.724∗ -.116 -.119
(.923) (.924) (.387) (.387)
Visibility -20.555∗∗∗ -20.398∗∗∗ -6.598∗∗∗ -6.637∗∗∗
(2.558) (2.563) (1.217) (1.221)
Spawning -32.937∗∗∗ -33.549∗∗∗ -18.948∗∗∗ -19.121∗∗∗
(6.079) (6.079) (2.134) (2.128)
D2003 19.886∗∗∗ 19.248∗∗∗ 8.778∗∗∗ 8.836∗∗∗
(5.269) (5.300) (2.398) (2.413)
D2004 41.066∗∗∗ 40.539∗∗∗ 5.630∗∗ 5.689∗∗
(5.345) (5.371) (2.402) (2.410)
D2005 -18.287∗∗∗ -18.065∗∗∗ -10.882∗∗∗ -10.808∗∗∗
(5.284) (5.282) (2.245) (2.246)
D2006 -9.006∗ -8.218 -10.164∗∗∗ -10.049∗∗∗
(5.468) (5.466) (2.237) (2.239)
N 2480 2480 2301 2301
R2 0.130 0.130 .084 .083
F 25.288 25.096
Table 4.2: Estimation Results for Linear and Tobit Models.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The ﬁrst essay, “The Effects of Policy Rigidity on Optimal Fisheries Management,” exam-
ines the consequences of policy rigidity for ﬁsheries management. Use of rigid policies is a
frequent management strategy in ﬁsheries management. Firstly, rigidity without stochastic
growth causes only minor changes in the value of the stock. Negative impacts to the ﬁshery
are conﬁned to the adjustment phase, during which the ﬁshery moves towards a steady-state
stock level. Secondly, rigidity combined with stochastic growth can produce large effects
on both the value of the ﬁshery and the probability of collapse. By examining changes in
the value function, the tradeoffs between management speed and scientiﬁc accuracy and the
threshold at which the returns to scientiﬁc information diminish can be determined. Finally,
the effect of policy rigidity on the optimal policy is not uniformly “conservative.” Rigidity
implies precaution (lower harvest levels) when the stock of ﬁsh is healthy. However, when
anticipated future growth is low (current stocks either very low or very large), management
with a rigid policy advocates higher harvest levels compared with ﬂexible policy.
In the simulations presented, the biological and economic parameters were chosen so
that immediate extinction was non-optimal. When growth is stochastic, extinction is a
byproduct of the optimizing manager; higher current period payoffs are preferred to a lower
probability of collapse. For any level of uncertainty, management with rigidity implies
(weakly) higher probabilities of ﬁshery collapse. This ﬁnding may partially explains some
historical collapse of ﬁsheries; if low stock growth is difﬁcult to detect, continued high lev-
els of harvest will rapidly deplete a resource. However, rigid policies may have advantages
relative to ﬂexible policies; these avoid transactions costs associated with negotiation of
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policy as well as frequent changes in capital mix or output disruptions, neither of which are
considered in this analysis.
The second essay in this dissertation, “Bargaining for Homogeneous Goods: The Days-
at-Sea Market, ” examines a tradable input permit market. Economists believe that markets
can achieve allocative efﬁciency; however, the ad-hocmarket that was created for Days-at-
Sea in the groundﬁsh ﬁshery suffers from many trading restrictions that may impede efﬁ-
ciency. Using linear and quantile regression, the Harding et al. (2003) model of bargaining
is applied to price formation in this market. By examining a homogeneous good, it is pos-
sible to econometrically test the bargaining power homogeneity assumption that Harding
et al. (2003) use for identiﬁcation. Using OLS and quantile regression, this analysis rejects
the bargaining power homogeneity restrictions for many demographic characteristics. The
major trading restriction is related to ﬁshing power (length); this restriction has endowed
certain parties (large sellers) with bargaining power that enables them to appropriate a
larger share of the gains from trade. While this restriction may have desirable conservation
outcomes (limited harvests by the ﬁshing ﬂeet), it appears to have created market power in
certain market segments.
The ﬁnal essay in this dissertation, “Economic Tradeoffs in the Gulf of Maine Ecosys-
tem: Herring and Whales” examines a small ecosystem-economy. Resource economists
modeled long-run predator-prey interactions in bioeconomic models (Hannesson, 1983;
Brown et al., 2005; Boncoeur et al., 2002; Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2005). This re-
search examines the short-run interactions between prey, predators, and users of both of
those resources. This study examines a small portion of the localized depletion theory:
search times of whale-watching vessels and ﬁnds moderate evidence that the herring ﬁsh-
ing has an negative impact on whale-watching search times. However, at current stock
levels of both herring and whales, the estimated economic impacts are small. A simulated
closure of the nearshore ﬁshery results in slightly shorter search times and small economic
gains for whale-watching ﬁrms relative to the costs imposed on the ﬁshing industry.
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Appendix A
Logistic Growth and a 2 Year Planning
Period
To ilustrate the mathematics of the model and the role of the logistic equation, we present
a brief exposition of the deterministic model of logistic growth with a two-year planning
period.
The Bellman equation (Equation 2.12) is:
J�t� St; k) = max
q�
�
k�
i=1
[δi�1pqj] + δ
kJ�t+ k� k�Gk�St� qj)}
The logistic growth function is often used in ﬁsheries models because of it’s relative
simplicity, ﬂexibility, and non-convexity. With logistic stock growth, the discrete-time,
single-year state equation is:
St+1 = G�St) = rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj.
For a two-year planning period, the G2 function can be written by recursion as:
G2�St) = G�ST+1) = G�G�St)) =
= r[rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj]�1−
rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj
K
}
+ rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj)− hj (A.1)
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Differentiating equation (A.1) with respect to hj produces:
G2h = −r�1−
rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj
K
}+
1
K
�rSt[rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj]} − 2
= −r�1−
2rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj
K
} − 2 (A.2)
Substitution into equation (2.12) produces the conditions for optimality that implicitly de-
ﬁne h∗j , the optimal harvest level:
p+ δp = δ2JS[rSt�1−
2rSt�1−
St
K
) + St − hj
K
} − 2] (A.3)
The terms on the left-hand side are the marginal beneﬁts of harvest. A marginal increase
in the harvest level leads to p additional revenues in the ﬁrst and second years, the second
of which is discounted at rate δ. The right-hand side is the discounted change in value of
escapement due to changes in harvest level. As before, JS retains its interpretation as the
marginal value of escapement at the end of the planning period. The term in the square
brackets is the marginal effect of increasing hj on the escapement.
While the objective function is linear in the control variable, G2�St) is not. Therefore,
Equation (A.3) implicitly deﬁnes h∗j , the optimal harvest policy. When JS is known, it is
possible to characterize the path of h∗j .
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Appendix B
Numerical Methods for Dynamic
Programming
A numerical simulation approach is used to learn about optimal harvest, escapement, and
ﬁshery value. For an inﬁnite time horizon, the problem is autonomous and Equation (2.9)
can be written as a non-linear rootﬁnding problem in J :
J�s)−max
q
�f�q) + δkP �s� q)J�s�)} = 0� (B.1)
where P �s� q) is a function that returns the probability of moving to state s� conditional on
being located in state s for any action q. The value of any state is equal to the largest sum of
the current payoffs plus the discounted expected value of the the state variable in the next
decision-making period.
The expected harvest is f�q) and is calculated as:
f�q) = Pr[qj ≤ Xi] ∗ qj + Pr[qj ≥ Xi] ∗ E[Xi|qj ≥ Xi] (B.2)
An iterative optimization method, often referred to as policy iteration, is used to ﬁnd J
(Judd, 1998). The policy iteration process is:
1. Specify an initial value J0.
2. Given J0, choose q0 that maximizes the term in curly braces in equation (B.1).
3. Calculate J1, the value function that results from q0.
4. If equation B.1 holds, then stop. Otherwise, update J0 and repeat steps 2 and 3.
The results of this iterative method are q∗�s), the optimal control, and J∗�s), the result-
ing value function. As noted by Miranda and Fackler, “the curse of dimensionality has
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has represented the most severe practical problem encountered in solving discrete Markov
decision models” (p167). While the state and action space are fairly small, introducing
uncertainty and rigidity exponentially increases both the state space and computation time.
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Appendix C
Days­at­Sea Leasing
This Appendix contains estimation results for an alternative speciﬁcation of the linear and
quantile regression models. These speciﬁcations use untransformed horsepower as a in-
dependent variable instead of the version of power (horsepower divided by length) that
is presented in the main text. These ﬁgures include OLS estimates and the corresponding
Wald tests for bargaining power equality, quantile regression results for 5 selected quantiles,
graphical representations of quantile regression results for selected independent variables,
and corresponding bargaining power equality tests.
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Coefﬁcient (1) (2) (3)
Length buyer 10.28*** 8.768*** 7.039***
(1.47) (1.21) (0.96)
Length seller 0.0161 1.818* 1.517*
(1.61) (1.04) (0.85)
Horsepower buyer -0.156 -0.0465 0.0663
(0.11) (0.095) (0.079)
Horsepower seller 0.0676 -0.0131 -0.00891
(0.073) (0.055) (0.049)
DAS buyer 1.546 -2.879 -0.395
(4.87) (3.63) (3.08)
DAS seller 7.213 8.983 5.225
(6.34) (6.57) (5.38)
Alternative buyer 2.642 1.059 1.610
(3.28) (2.56) (1.95)
Alternative seller 7.790*** 7.637*** 8.028***
(2.00) (1.88) (1.67)
Differential buyer 93.56 4.653 20.14
(57.4) (27.8) (24.2)
Differential seller -4.347 7.095 0.535
(38.9) (27.7) (24.3)
Experience buyer 0.448 -3.796* -3.477**
(3.65) (2.04) (1.65)
Experience seller -4.348 -3.905 -2.940
(5.65) (2.92) (2.53)
Trawl buyer 12.55 -55.82*** -70.76***
(34.5) (14.8) (10.5)
Trawl seller -85.60* -0.512 -14.76
(45.5) (14.4) (11.0)
Permits buyer 23.88* 0.0186 -3.882
(13.9) (7.11) (4.46)
Permits seller 7.952 14.52*** 26.88***
(6.93) (4.84) (4.04)
F42xDifferential buyer -97.83 -57.80 -88.53***
(69.3) (35.5) (27.1)
F42xDifferential seller 67.39 -19.13 -19.60
(73.1) (30.7) (25.4)
Framework42 10.38 98.61** 75.21**
(62.4) (45.3) (37.1)
N 1,788 1,781 1,756
R2 0.21 0.38 0.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.1: Alternative OLS Speciﬁcation Results, Part 1 of 2.
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Coefﬁcient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
D2005 -15.85 7.439 -31.05
(30.8) (27.3) (21.2)
D2006 207.8*** 152.8*** 143.0***
(51.4) (33.8) (28.1)
D2007 132.7* 36.13 46.80
(68.1) (46.7) (38.0)
D2008 192.2*** 80.14 85.87**
(70.3) (49.6) (39.4)
Month2 -22.73 -4.073 11.53
(36.5) (33.2) (29.8)
Month3 -88.99** -61.76* -49.25
(40.1) (37.0) (33.7)
Month4 -24.50 -4.285 -71.78**
(50.9) (48.4) (30.8)
Month5 38.16 16.13 -16.79
(51.5) (38.3) (28.4)
Month6 -36.61 -40.55 -64.41**
(47.3) (39.7) (30.9)
Month7 -136.2*** -138.2*** -137.3***
(38.1) (35.7) (28.2)
Month8 -97.72** -95.88** -125.0***
(42.5) (40.0) (28.7)
Month9 -128.4*** -128.6*** -117.4***
(37.6) (35.1) (28.6)
Month10 -104.5*** -116.3*** -115.7***
(38.1) (34.3) (26.3)
Month11 -90.52 -189.4*** -170.9***
(66.6) (33.2) (26.6)
Intercept -336.3*** -270.9*** -192.4***
(60.0) (49.9) (39.5)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.2: Alternative OLS Speciﬁcation Results, Part 2 of 2.
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(1) (2) (3)
Length 56.61 87.39 136
Horsepower 0.80 0.52 0.74
DAS 1.16 0.66 0.61
Alternative 6.43 6.32 15.08
Permits 5.42 3.54 18.38
Trawl 7.29 8.50 34.78
Experience 0.49 5.26 4.75
Differential 3.42 0.12 0.55
F42xDifferential 0.12 3.63 11.21
Table C.3: F-statistics for the Hypothesis that Buyer and Seller Characteristics have equal
effects on bargaining power. Critical values corresponding to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
signiﬁcance are 2.71, 3.85, and 6.65 respectively.
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Coefﬁcient 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Length buyer 0.854
� 0�821)
4.909
� 0�891)
7.212
� 0�918)
7.883
� 1�021)
10.073
� 1�545)
Length seller − 0.149
� 0�505)
− 1.604
� 0�701)
1.981
� 0�775)
3.056
� 0�899)
2.614
� 1�365)
Horsepower buyer 0.003
� 0�032)
− 0.035
� 0�063)
0.131
� 0�072)
0.116
� 0�071)
− 0.066
� 0�097)
Horsepower seller − 0.008
� 0�021)
− 0.039
� 0�036)
0.001
� 0�050)
0.069
� 0�053)
0.186
� 0�072)
DAS buyer − 2.210
� 2�715)
− 1.137
� 3�040)
3.814
� 2�937)
0.000
� 3�026)
− 1.004
� 4�462)
DAS seller − 1.784
� 5�203)
9.957
� 5�795)
6.862
� 2�618)
11.799
� 4�197)
11.992
� 5�346)
Alternative buyer 0.220
� 1�350)
− 0.112
� 2�027)
1.363
� 1�952)
1.640
� 2�071)
− 1.802
� 2�686)
Alternative seller 6.759
� 5�344)
14.561
� 2�690)
7.731
� 1�995)
3.454
� 1�318)
− 1.824
� 2�100)
Permits buyer − 0.353
� 1�975)
− 0.657
� 3�776)
− 10.279
� 4�285)
− 3.929
� 5�279)
12.380
� 8�516)
Permits seller 12.447
� 8�124)
40.371
� 4�445)
14.460
� 4�224)
5.371
� 3�925)
− 8.442
� 5�965)
Experience buyer − 0.622
� 0�816)
− 1.762
� 1�303)
− 2.695
� 1�486)
− 1.009
� 1�441)
− 2.337
� 1�742)
Experience seller − 0.872
� 1�188)
− 2.855
� 1�859)
− 0.361
� 2�030)
− 0.038
� 2�252)
− 1.926
� 2�738)
Trawl buyer − 14.255
� 10�699)
− 52.475
� 12�334)
− 54.349
� 11�994)
− 45.843
� 12�905)
13.507
� 19�233)
Trawl seller 6.858
� 6�874)
11.573
� 12�697)
− 27.599
� 13�207)
− 2.853
� 11�097)
− 0.972
� 13�965)
Differential buyer − 1.465
� 14�596)
17.585
� 24�974)
18.322
� 23�413)
− 0.759
� 23�540)
− 2.644
� 37�113)
Differential seller − 15.996
� 34�778)
− 8.472
� 29�986)
9.087
� 22�962)
8.037
� 21�823)
23.900
� 28�101)
F42xDifferential buyer 20.378
� 16�590)
− 16.411
� 28�298)
−116.923
� 26�762)
−110.910
� 26�839)
−124.477
� 43�324)
F42xDifferential seller − 1.930
� 34�518)
− 21.644
� 30�647)
4.972
� 27�866)
− 14.022
� 24�589)
− 23.115
� 35�038)
Framework42 − 14.906
� 16�291)
− 76.149
� 43�438)
64.810
� 36�412)
112.486
� 39�673)
153.177
� 44�661)
R1 0.020 0.153 0.311 0.401 0.331
Table C.4: Quantile Regression coefﬁcients for selected quantiles. Standard errors in paren-
theses, generated using 20,000 bootstrap replications.
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Coefﬁcient 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
D2005 − 11.096
� 13�311)
− 32.719
� 18�664)
− 16.189
� 21�782)
5.769
� 19�119)
15.747
� 28�295)
D2006 0.029
� 13�620)
119.485
� 38�532)
165.352
� 26�231)
196.953
� 27�168)
237.286
� 44�000)
D2007 4.217
� 17�412)
141.415
� 41�228)
113.362
� 37�866)
51.977
� 42�161)
21.836
� 53�087)
D2008 12.949
� 19�628)
160.261
� 41�974)
129.515
� 37�661)
74.537
� 43�237)
53.866
� 56�494)
Month2 3.442
� 62�256)
3.332
� 39�837)
− 8.616
� 30�966)
− 37.677
� 24�977)
− 33.908
� 36�690)
Month3 − 15.771
� 35�817)
−101.273
� 40�199)
− 25.851
� 38�079)
− 36.630
� 23�700)
− 44.334
� 36�504)
Month4 − 21.662
� 36�529)
− 83.689
� 39�651)
− 38.963
� 35�462)
− 15.668
� 27�310)
− 10.572
� 75�752)
Month5 − 13.954
� 36�524)
− 29.094
� 37�407)
− 20.906
� 30�759)
− 12.802
� 27�578)
7.270
� 41�083)
Month6 − 15.445
� 35�479)
− 88.896
� 37�472)
− 49.437
� 33�565)
− 31.453
� 25�045)
− 22.141
� 47�770)
Month7 − 13.047
� 35�953)
− 96.516
� 35�559)
−105.533
� 32�629)
− 90.975
� 28�390)
− 60.769
� 36�030)
Month8 − 19.656
� 36�538)
− 97.027
� 36�896)
− 87.510
� 34�680)
− 48.499
� 25�785)
− 59.583
� 35�036)
Month9 − 17.040
� 35�535)
− 83.806
� 37�695)
− 93.458
� 32�815)
− 86.511
� 23�230)
− 92.707
� 38�463)
Month10 − 10.705
� 35�417)
− 97.825
� 34�204)
−106.522
� 30�298)
−106.064
� 22�890)
−112.975
� 32�652)
Month11 − 7.036
� 35�276)
−103.497
� 34�900)
−152.206
� 31�734)
−144.816
� 24�205)
−149.638
� 31�943)
Constant − 4.370
� 40�554)
− 19.664
� 51�999)
−267.883
� 54�406)
−313.626
� 41�414)
−334.546
� 49�018)
Table C.5: Quantile Regression Results, continued.
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Figure C.1: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Length.
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Figure C.2: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Length.
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Figure C.3: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Horsepower.
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Figure C.4: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Horsepower.
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Figure C.5: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer DAS Revenue.
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Figure C.6: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller DAS Revenue.
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Figure C.7: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Alternative Revenue.
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Figure C.8: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Permits.
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Figure C.9: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Alternative Revenue.
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Figure C.10: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Permits.
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Figure C.11: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Buyer Differential DAS.
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Figure C.12: Quantile Regression Coefﬁcients - Seller Differential DAS.
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0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Length 1.473 16.667 101.905 186.280 103.971
Horsepower 0.082 5.466 7.391 12.240 3.375
DAS 0.023 1.900 4.504 9.571 2.502
Alternative 0.678 0.150 1.724 0.001 0.034
Permits 0.102 1.660 1.234 0.013 0.015
Experience 0.079 2.751 6.809 8.042 2.555
Trawl 1.812 17.187 10.767 4.438 1.186
Differential 0.490 2.395 7.474 4.944 2.521
F42xDifferential 0.286 0.076 1.041 0.057 0.270
Table C.6: Wald Test statistics for Bargaining Power Homogeneity at select quantiles.
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